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Abstract
In this paper a conditional logic is defined and studied. This conditional logic,
DmBL, is constructed as a deterministic counterpart to the Bayesian conditional. The
logic is unrestricted, so that any logical operations are allowed. A notion of logical
independence is also defined within the logic itself. This logic is shown to be non-
trivial and is not reduced to classical propositions. A model is constructed for the logic.
Completeness results are proved. It is shown that any unconditioned probability can be
extended to the whole logic DmBL. The Bayesian conditional is then recovered from the
probabilistic DmBL. At last, it is shown why DmBL is compliant with Lewis’ triviality.
Keywords: Probability, Bayesian inference, Conditional Logic, Modal Logic, Probabilistic Logic
1 Introduction
Bayesian inference is a powerful principle for modeling and manipulating probabilistic infor-
mation. In many cases, Bayesian inference is considered as an optimal and legitimate rule
for inferring such information.
• Bayesian filters for example, and their approximations by means of sequential Monte-
Carlo, are typically regarded as optimal filters [4, 32, 9],
• Bayesian networks are particularly powerful tools for modeling uncertain information,
since they merge logical and independence priors, for reducing the complexity of the
laws, with the possibility of learning [35, 30, 13].
Although Bayesian inference is an established principle, it is recalled [26] that it has been
disputed until the middle of the XXth century, in particular by the frequencist community.
What made the Bayesian inference established is chiefly a logical justification of the rule [11,
26]. Some convergence with the frequencist interpretation achieved this acceptation. Cox
derived the characteristics of Probability and of Bayesian conditional from hypothesized
axioms about the probabilistic system, which themselves were reduced in terms of functional
equations. Typical axioms are:
• The operation which maps the probability of a proposition to the probability of its
negation is idempotent,
• The probability of A ∧ B depends only of the probability of A and of the probability
of B given that A is true,
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• The probability of a proposition is independent of the way it is deduced (consistency).
It is noticed that Cox interpretation has been criticized recently for some imprecision and
reconsidered [16, 15, 25].
In some sense, Cox justification of the Bayesian conditional is not entirely satisfactory, since
it is implicit: it justifies the Bayesian conditional as the operator fulfilling some natural
properties, but does not construct a full underlying logic priorly to the probability. The
purpose of this paper is to construct an explicit logic for the Bayesian conditional as a
conditional logic:
1. Build a (deterministic) conditional logic, priorly to any notion of probability. This logic
will extend the classical propositional logic. It will contain a conditional operator (·|·),
so that the conditional proposition (ψ|φ) could be built for any propositions φ and ψ,
2. Being given a probability p over the unconditioned propositions, derive the probabilistic
Bayesian conditional from an extension p of the probability p over this conditional logic.
More precisely, the Bayesian conditional will be derived by p(ψ|φ) = p
(
(ψ|φ)
)
.
The construction of an explicit underlying logic provides a better understanding of the
Bayesian conditional, but will also make possible the comparison with other rules for manip-
ulating probabilistic information, based on other logics [14].
It is known that the construction of such underlying logic is heavily constrained by Lewis’
triviality [29], which has shown some critical issues related to the notion of conditional prob-
ability; refer also to [24, 23, 37]. In particular, Lewis’ result implies strong hypotheses about
the nature of the conditionals. In most cases, the conditionals have to be constructed outside
the space of unconditioned propositions. This result implied the way the logic of Bayesian
conditional has been investigated. Many approaches do not distinguish the Bayesian condi-
tional from probabilistic notions. This is particularly the case of the theory called Bayesian
Logic [3], which is an extension of probabilistic logic programming by the way of Bayesian
conditioning. Other approaches like conditional logic or algebra result in the construction
of conditional operators, which finally arise as abstraction independent of any probability.
These logical constructions are approximating the Bayesian conditional or are constrained
in use. The Bayesian inference is a rich notion. It is also evocated subsequently, how the
Bayesian inference has been applied to the definition of default reasoning systems [8].
Since Lewis’ triviality is a fundamental reference in this work, it is introduced now. By the
way, different logical approaches of the Bayesian conditional are evocated, and it is shown
how these approaches avoid the triviality.
Lewis’ triviality. Let Ω be the set of all events, and M be the set of measurable subsets
of Ω. Let Pr(M) be the set of all probability measures defined on M. Lewis’ triviality [29]
may be expressed as follows:
Let A,B ∈M with ∅ ( B ( A ( Ω . Then, it is impossible to build a proposition (B|A) ∈ M
such that π
(
(B|A)
)
= π(B|A)
∆
= pi(A∩B)
pi(A) for any π ∈ Pr(M) with 0 < π(B) < π(A) < 1 .
Lewis’ triviality thus makes impossible the construction of a (Bayesian) conditional operator
within the same Boolean space.
Proof. For any propositions C,D , define πC(D) = π(D|C) =
pi(C∩D)
pi(C) , when π(C) > 0.
The proof of Lewis’ result relies of the following calculus:
π((B|A)|C) = πC((B|A)) = πC(B|A) =
πC(A ∩B)
πC(A)
=
pi(C∩A∩B)
pi(C)
pi(A∩C)
pi(C)
=
π(C ∩A ∩B)
π(A ∩ C)
= π(B|C ∩ A) .
(1)
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Denoting ∼ B = Ω \B, it is inferred then:
π(B)
π(A)
=
π(A ∩B)
π(A)
= π(B|A) = π((B|A)) = π((B|A)|B)π(B) + π((B|A)| ∼ B)π(∼ B)
= π(B|B ∩ A)π(B) + π(B| ∼ B ∩ A)π(∼ B) = 1× π(B) + 0× π(∼ B) = π(B) ,
which contradicts the hypotheses π(B) 6= 0 and π(A) 6= 1 .
✷✷✷
In fact, the derivation (1) relies on the hypothesis that (B|A) ∈M, which implies by defini-
tion of (B|A) the relation πC
(
(B|A)
)
πC(A) = πC(B ∩ A) .
If the proposition (B|A) is outside M, it becomes necessary to build for any probability π
its extension π over the outside propositions; in particular, it will be defined π
(
(B|A)
)
=
π(B∩A)/π(A), for any A,B ∈ M . In practice, there is no reason to have πC(D) = π
(
(D|C)
)
for D 6∈ M ; then, the above triviality does not work anymore.
The property πC 6= π
(
(·|C)
)
is somewhat counter-intuitive. In particular, it means that con-
ditionals are not conserved by conditional probabilities. However, it allows the construction
of a conditional logic for the Bayesian conditional; our work provides an example of such
construction.
Probabilistic logic and Bayesian logic. Probabilistic logic, as defined by Nilsson [31, 33,
34], has been widely studied in order to model and manipulate the uncertain information.
It tracks back from the seminal work of Boole [7]. In probabilistic logic, the knowledge,
while logically encoded by classical propositions, is expressed by means of constraints on the
probability over these propositions. For example, the knowledge over the propositions A,B
may be described by:
v1 ≤ p(A) ≤ v2 and v3 ≤ p(A→ B) ≤ v4 , (2)
where A→ B ≡ ¬A∨B and vi|1 ≤ i ≤ 4 are known bound over the probabilities. Equations
like (2) turn out to be a linear set of constraints over p. In other words, it is then possible
to characterize all the possible values for p by means of a linear system. For example, if our
purpose is to know the possible values for p(B), we just have to solve:
v1 ≤ p(A ∧B) + p(A ∧ ¬B) ≤ v2 ,
v3 ≤ p(A ∧B) + p(¬A ∧B) + p(¬A ∧ ¬B) ≤ v4 ,
p(A ∧B) + p(¬A ∧B) = p(B) .
Notice that probabilistic logic by itself does not manipulate conditional probabilities or any
notion of independence. Proposals for extending the probabilistic logic to conditionals has
appeared rather early [1], but Andersen and Hooker [2, 3] introduced an efficient modeling
and solve of such problems. This new paradigm for manipulating Bayesian probabilistic
constraints has been called Bayesian Logic.
For example, let us introduce a new proposition C to problem (2). Assume now that the
new system is characterized by a bound over the conditional probability p(C|A ∧B) and by
an independence hypothesis between A and B. The set of constraints could be rewritten as:{
v1 ≤ p(A) ≤ v2 and v3 ≤ p(A→ B) ≤ v4 ,
v5 ≤ p(C|A ∧B) ≤ v6 and p(A ∧B) = p(A)p(B) .
The constraint on p(C|A ∧B) turns out to be linear, since it could be rewritten:
v5 p(A ∧B) ≤ p(C ∧ A ∧B) ≤ v6 p(A ∧B) ,
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but constraint p(A∧B) = p(A)p(B) remains essentially a non-linear constraint. Constraints
involving both conditional and non-conditional probabilities also generate non-linearity. In [2]
and more thoroughly in [3], Andersen and Hooker expose a methodology for solving these
non-linear programs. In particular, the structure of the Bayesian Network is being used in
order to reduce the number of non-linear constraints.
Bayesian Logic is a paradigm for solving probabilistic constraint programs, which involve
Bayesian constraints. Since it does not construct the Bayesian conditional as a strict logical
operator, this theory is not concerned by Lewis’ triviality. Bayesian Logic departs funda-
mentally from our approach, since Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic intends to build the
logic underlying the Bayesian conditional priorly to the notion of probability.
Conditional Event algebra. In Conditional Event Algebra [21, 22, 18, 10], the conditional
could be seen as an external operator ( | ) , which maps pairs of unconditioned propositions
toward an external Boolean space, while satisfying the properties related to the Bayesian
conditional. There are numerous possible constructions of a CEA. In fact, most CEAs provide
conditional rules which are richer than the strict Bayesian conditional. For example, the CEA,
denoted DGNW [21], is characterized by the following properties:{
(a|b) ∧ (c|d) =
(
a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d
∣∣(¬a ∧ b) ∨ (¬c ∧ d) ∨ (b ∧ d)) ,
(a|b) ∨ (c|d) =
(
(a ∧ b) ∨ (c ∧ d)
∣∣(a ∧ b) ∨ (c ∧ d) ∨ (b ∧ d)) . (3)
Property (3) infers the general Bayesian rule:
(a|b ∧ c) ∧ (b|c) = (a ∧ b|c) ,
but also a Boolean morphism:
(a ∧ b|c) = (a|c) ∧ (b|c) and (a ∨ b|c) = (a|c) ∨ (b|c) . (4)
Notice that the external space hypothesis is fundamental here, and it is not possible to write
(a|Ω) = a where Ω is the set of all events. In particular, DGNW allows (a|b)∧(b|Ω) = (a∧b|Ω),
but not (a|b) ∧ b = a ∧ b .
Now, property (3) defines much more combinations than the strict Bayesian conditional. In-
deed, the combination (a|b)∧ (c|d) is reduced for any choice of a, b, c, d, which is not possible
with a classical Bayesian combination.
The counterpart of such nice properties is the necessity to restrict the conditional to uncon-
ditioned propositions. It is yet proposed in [21] a closure of DGNW:(
(a|b)
∣∣(c|d)) = (a∣∣(b ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬d) ∨ (b ∧ c ∧ d)) , (5)
but this closure is not compatible with a probabilistic interpretation and fails to satisfy
the intuitive relation P
(
(a|b)
∣∣(c|d)) = P ((a|b) ∧ (c|d))/P (c|d) . More generally, CEAs are
practically restricted to only one level of conditioning, and usually avoid any interferences
between unconditioned and conditioned propositions. These restrictions are also the way, by
which CEAs avoid Lewis’ triviality.
Conditional logics. Conditional is an ambiguous word, since there may be different mean-
ing owing to the community. Even the classical inference, φ→ ψ ≡ ¬φ∨ψ , is called material
conditional. Despite classical inference is systematically used by mathematicians, its disjunc-
tive definition makes it improper for some conditions of use. For example, it is known that it
is by essence non-constructive, an issue which tracks back to the foundation of modern math-
ematic [38]. Somehow, the possibility to infer from the contradiction is also counter-intuitive;
by the way, the Bayesian inference makes no sense, while inferring from the contradiction.
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In the framework of Bayesian inference, we are interested in defining the law of a conditional
independently of the factual state of the hypothesis. Thus, the Bayesian conditional could
be related to the notion of Counterfactual conditional. The classical inference is actually not
counterfactual, since it is by definition dependent of the hypothesis. From now on, the notion
of conditional will refer to counterfactual conditionals, and related extensions.
A non-classical inference is often related to a modal paradigm. While first defining counter-
factual conditionals (an example of such conditional, VCU, is detailed in section 3.2), the
philosophers David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker [28, 36] based their model constructions on
the possible world semantics of modal logic (other authors also consider Kripke model ex-
tensions [19]). Stalnaker claimed that it was possible to construct such conditional, denoted
>, within the universe of events, so as to match the probabilistic Bayesian conditional, i.e.
p(A > B) = p(B|A) = p(A ∧ B)/p(A). Lewis answered negatively [29] to this conjecture.
However, this was not the end of the interaction between conditional logics and probabilities.
On the basis of the semantic, Lewis proposed an alternative interpretation of the probability
p(A > B), called Imaging [27].
It is not our purpose to detail these notions here, but we point out the following:
• The probabilistic interpretation of the conditional by imaging does not provide an inter-
pretation of the probabilistic Bayesian conditional. Nevertheless, Stalnaker’s conjecture
could be weakened so as to overcome the triviality: as already explained in our previous
discussion, the triviality could be avoided by constructing the conditionals outside the
classical propositions space and extending the probability accordingly,
• The existing conditional logics are still rough approximations of the Bayesian condi-
tional. This point will be discussed in details later. But for example, it seems that the
negation operators of the existing conditional logics are usually relaxed, when compared
to the Bayesian conditioning (refer to the logic VCU defined in section 3.2). Typically,
a relation like ¬(φ > ψ) ≡ φ > ¬ψ , i.e. a logical counterpart of p(¬ψ|φ) = 1− p(ψ|φ) ,
is not retrieved.1 It contradicts the axiom ⊢ φ > φ (Id) which is widely accepted in the
literature; refer to deduction (18) in section 3.2.
Default reasoning. Default reasonings are related to logical systems which are able to
deduce what normally happens, when only partial information are available. The idea is to
use default rules or default information. Then, the most plausible assumptions are deduced,
in regards to the current information. Of course, some conclusions may be retracted, if they
are corrected by new sources of information.
It is noticed that the Bayesian inference is able of some kind of default reasoning, by adapting
the belief of a proposition according to an hypothesis. In fact, the system P for default
reasoning could be derived from a Bayesian interpretation [1, 17, 8]. The ε−semantic is
particularly enlightening. Let us denote φ ⇒ ψ the default, which means “ψ is normally
true, when φ holds true”. Then let us interpret φ ⇒ ψ by the constraint p(ψ|φ) ≥ 1 − ε,
where ε is an infinitesimal.2 Now, it is deduced from the Bayesian inference:
p(η|φ ∧ ψ) =
p(η|φ)−
(
1− p(ψ|φ)
)
p(η|φ ∧ ¬ψ)
p(ψ|φ)
. (6)
From hypotheses φ ⇒ ψ and φ ⇒ η, it would come p(ψ|φ) ≥ 1 − ε1 and p(η|φ) ≥ 1 − ε2,
where ε1 and ε2 are infinitesimals, and then by (6):
p(η|φ ∧ ψ) ≥ 1− ǫ1 − ǫ2 and φ ∧ ψ ⇒ η .
1This property could also be related to the Boolean morphism (4) of CEA.
2Notice that the definition of ⇒ is a meta-definition (or also a second-order definition) .
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This deduction conduces to the well known Cautious Monotonicity rule:
CM :
φ⇒ ψ, φ⇒ η
φ ∧ ψ ⇒ η
.
The rule CM already infers some default reasoning:
Assume b ⇒ f (birds normally fly), p ⇒ b (penguins normally are birds) and
p ⇒ ¬f (penguins normally do not fly). Then by applying CM on p ⇒ b and
p ⇒ ¬f , it comes p ∧ b ⇒ ¬f . The non-monotonic inference ⇒ is thus able to
handle sub-cases.
From the infinitesimal probabilistic interpretation, the following rules of P are also deduced:
Id:
φ⇒φ RW:
⊢ψ→η, φ⇒ψ
φ⇒η
⊢φ↔ψ, φ⇒η
ψ⇒η
φ⇒ψ, φ⇒η
φ⇒ψ∧η
φ⇒η, ψ⇒η
φ∨ψ⇒η .
System P shares some common rules with existing conditional logics (e.g. (Id) is in VCU and
Right Weakening (RW) is a sub-case of rule (CR) of VCU; refer to section 3.2). However, the
default ⇒ appears as a meta-operator, which acts as an external operator over the classical
propositions only. Contrary to CEA DGNW, equation (4), the default propositions φ ⇒ ψ
do not constitute a Boolean space which maps from the classical propositions by a Boolean
morphism. Both properties (internal operator and Boolean morphism) are desirable, for a
logical interpretation of the Bayesian conditional. But system P allows default reasoning,
while DGNW and VCU (and DmBL, defined subsequently) are incompatible with it (equa-
tion (3), axiom Ax.4 of VCU defined in section 3.2).
Also related to the infinitesimal interpretation is the ranking of the models (typically, a rank
is interpreted as an infinitesimal order). The ranking conditions the way the defaults are
prioritized. There has been various extension of system P (alternative inferences, ranking
methods). In some recent works, Lukasiewicz et al. [5] proposed a probabilistic extension
of default reasonings (including system P ), which is not restricted to an infinitesimal prob-
abilistic interpretation. Each default is then associated to an interval of constraint for its
probability.
Why a new conditional logic? The previous approaches and uses of the Bayesian logic
imply restrictions or approximations to the logical interpretation of the Bayesian conditional.
Bayesian logic does not provide a logical interpretation of the Bayesian conditional, but rather
a methodology for solving the program related to a probabilistic Bayesian modeling. Condi-
tional event algebras provide an interesting logical interpretation of the Bayesian conditional,
but are highly constrained in their definition; from a logical viewpoint, the impossibility to
handle or to combine multiple-levels conditionals constitutes a limitation in terms of the
coherence of the models. Existing conditional logics are insufficient for characterizing the
Bayesian conditional properly. The default reasoning systems and their interpretation by
means of the probabilistic Bayesian inference are quite interesting and a source of inspira-
tion, but they are mainly a consequence of the probabilistic Bayesian inference and account
for the Bayesian conditional only partially. Our work intends to overcome these limitations,
by constructing a new conditional logic which is in accordance with the Bayesian conditional.
It is not our purpose, however, to enrich the Bayesian rule, as it is proposed in most CEA.
Our logic, denoted Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic (DmBL), is constructed according to
a modal background (system T). The conditional operator is defined in parallel to a relation
of logical independence. This relation is defined within the logic, and not at a meta-level. The
probabilistic Bayesian inference is recovered from the derived logical theorems and the logical
independence. This process implies an extension of probability from the unconditioned logic
toward DmBL. As a final result, a theorem is proved that guarantees the existence of such
extension (Lewis’ result is thus avoided).
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Section 2 is dedicated to the definition of the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic. The
languages, axioms and rules are introduced. In section 3, several theorems of the logic are
derived. A purely logical interpretation of Lewis’ triviality is made, and DmBL is compared
with other systems. A model for DmBL is constructed in section 4. A partial completeness
theorem is derived. The extension of probabilities over DmBL is investigated in section 5.
The probabilistic Bayesian inference is recovered from this extension. The paper is then
concluded.
2 Definition of the logics
Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic was first defined without modality as Deterministic
Bayesian Logic in a previous version of this document [12]. The non-modal definition is
uneasy to handle. For this new modal definition, we have been inspired by the seminal work
of Lewis [28], and also by more recent works of Laura Giordano et al., which use the modality
for specifying the conditional behavior [19, 20]. The use of the modality is instrumental here;
for this reason, modal appears in lower case in our terminology.
Modal logic is a powerful tool, but not intuitive at first sight. We thus decided to introduce
the modality softly, by interpreting it (in part) from probabilistic considerations: modalities
will be used in order to characterize properties generally true for any possible probability.
Nevertheless, this instrumental use of modalities allows an abstraction which makes our
construction independent to any notion of probability.
Introducing the modal notation. This paragraph intends to explain the intuition behind
the subsequent modal definition of DmBL. Some generalizations are not justified here, but
the axioms are extrapolated from results, which are easily proved.
The logic of a system is the collection of behaviors which are common to any instance of this
system. Let us consider the example of probability on a finite (unconditioned) propositional
space. For convenience, define P the set of strictly positive probabilities over this space, that
is p ∈ P is such that p(φ) > 0 for any non-empty proposition φ :
P =
{
p
/
p is a probability and ∀φ 6≡ ⊥, p(φ) > 0
}
.
When the proposition φ is always true (i.e. φ is the set of all events), it is known that
p(φ) = 1 for any possible probability p. This could be interpreted logically as follows:
⊢ φ implies ⊢ ∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1 . (7)
This is a typical logical relation related to the probabilities. Notice however that:
φ→ ∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1 is false in general ,
because unless φ is always true, the property ∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1 is necessary false.3
It is also obvious that ∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1 infers φ (consider the cases ⊢ φ and 0 φ) :
⊢ (∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1)→ φ . (8)
Another proposition is easily derived:
⊢ (∀p ∈ P, p(¬φ ∨ ψ) = 1)→
(
(∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1)→ (∀p ∈ P, p(ψ) = 1)
)
. (9)
This last proposition could be considered as a modus ponens encoded by means of the
probabilities (it is recalled that φ → ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ). Now, by using the abbreviation
3In first order logic, being able to prove B when hypothesizing A implies that A→ B is proved (assumption
discharge). On this second order example, the assumption discharge does not work anymore!
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✷φ =
(
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1
)
, the propositions (7), (8) and (9) are turned into:
⊢ φ implies ⊢ ✷φ ,
⊢ ✷φ→ φ ,
⊢ ✷(φ→ ψ)→ (✷φ→ ✷ψ) .
These are exactly the modal axioms and rule of the system T of modal logic. System T is the
backbone of our conditional logic, DmBL. Additional axioms are also introduced for charac-
terizing the conditional (·|·). These axioms are extrapolated from unconditioned probabilistic
characterizations. For example, it is proved for unconditioned propositions:
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) + p(ψ) = 1 implies φ ≡ ¬ψ . (10)
Since it is also known that p(ψ|φ)+p(¬ψ|φ) = 1 for any p ∈ P, it will be assumed the axiom:
(ψ|φ) ≡ ¬(¬ψ|φ) . (11)
Of course, property (10) normally holds for unconditioned propositions only, so that ax-
iom (11) comes in fact from an extrapolation of (10).
Similarly, it is noticed that:
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) + p(ψ) ≤ p(η) + p(ζ) implies ⊢ (φ ∨ ψ)→ (η ∨ ζ) . (12)
Since p(ψ|φ) + p(⊥) ≤ p(¬φ ∨ ψ) + p(⊥) for any p ∈ P, it will be assumed the axiom:
⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) . (13)
Since p(ψ ∨ η|φ) + p(⊥) ≤ p(ψ|φ) + p(η|φ) for any p ∈ P, it is also extrapolated that
⊢ (ψ ∨ η|φ)→
(
(ψ|φ) ∨ (η|φ)
)
. Then, by applying (11), it comes:
⊢ (ψ → η|φ)→
(
(ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)
)
, (14)
which constitutes a modus ponens for the conditional. Axioms (11), (13) and (14) are not
completely new. In particular, they infer the Boolean morphism (4) of CEA. They are not
fully implemented by the existing conditional logics, however.
In order to complete this introduction, it is also noticed that:
⊢
(
∀p ∈ P, p(¬φ ∨ ψ) = 1
)
→
(
(∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 0) ∨ (∀p ∈ P, p(ψ|φ) = 1)
)
. (15)
The interpretation and proof of (15) is simple: when φ is a “subset” of ψ, then either φ is
empty or p(ψ|φ) = 1 for any strictly positive probability p. From (15), it is then extrapolated:
⊢ ✷(φ→ ψ)→
(
✷¬φ ∨ ✷(ψ|φ)
)
. (16)
In fact, these extrapolated axioms imply constraints, when extending the probabilities p ∈ P
over the conditioned propositions. This paper intends to prove that these constraints are
actually valid, in regard to Lewis’ triviality. It is now time for the logic definition.
Language. Let Θ = {θi/i ∈ I} be a set of atomic propositions.
The language LC of the classical logic related to Θ is the smallest set such that:{
Θ ⊂ LC
¬φ ∈ LC and φ→ ψ ∈ LC for any φ, ψ ∈ LC
The language LT of the modal logic T related to Θ is the smallest set such that:{
Θ ⊂ LT
¬φ ∈ LT , ✷φ ∈ LT and φ→ ψ ∈ LT for any φ, ψ ∈ LT
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The language L of the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic related to Θ is the smallest set
such that: {
Θ ⊂ L
¬φ ∈ L , ✷φ ∈ L , φ→ ψ ∈ L and (ψ|φ) ∈ L for any φ, ψ ∈ L
In the construction of the propositions, the unary operators have priority over the binary
operators; for example ¬φ ∨ ψ = (¬φ) ∨ ψ . The following abbreviations are defined:
• φ ∨ ψ = ¬φ→ ψ , φ ∧ ψ = ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ) and φ↔ ψ = (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ) ,
• It is chosen a proposition θ ∈ Θ, and it is then denoted ⊤ = θ → θ and ⊥ = ¬⊤ ,
• ✸φ = ¬✷¬φ ,
• ψ × φ = ✷
(
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
)
.
⊤ and ⊥ are idealistic notations for the tautology and the contradiction. The operator ×
describes the logical independence between propositions. The independence relation × and
the conditional (|) are thus conjointly defined.
We also define abbreviations for the notion of proof:
• ⊢ φ means “φ is proved” ,
• φ ≡ ψ means ⊢ φ↔ ψ.
The meta-relation ≡ is the logical equivalence.
Rules and axioms. The classical Logic C is characterized by the Modus ponens and the
classical axioms c∗ described subsequently.
The modal Logic T is characterized by the Modus ponens, the classical axioms c∗ and the
modal rule/axioms m∗ described subsequently (c.f. also [6]).
The Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic , i.e. DmBL, is characterized by the Modus ponens,
the classical axioms c∗, the modal rule/axioms m∗ and the Bayesian axioms b∗ :
c1. ⊢ φ→ (ψ → φ) ,
c2. ⊢ (η → (φ→ ψ))→ ((η → φ)→ (η → ψ)) ,
c3. ⊢ (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ) ,
Modus ponens. ⊢ φ and ⊢ φ→ ψ implies ⊢ ψ ,
m1. ⊢ φ implies ⊢ ✷φ ,
m2. ⊢ ✷(φ→ ψ)→ (✷φ→ ✷ψ) ,
m3. ⊢ ✷φ→ φ ,
b1. ⊢ ✷(φ→ ψ)→
(
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ|φ)
)
,
b2. ⊢ (ψ → η|φ)→
(
(ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)
)
,
b3. ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) ,
b4. ¬(¬ψ|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ,
b5. (× is symmetric) : ψ × φ ≡ φ× ψ ,
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DmBL∗, a weakened version of DmBL, is defined by replacing b5 by the alternative axioms:
b5.weak.A. ψ × ¬φ ≡ ψ × φ ,
b5.weak.B. ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
(
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
)
.
The axioms m∗ and b1 to b4 have been introduced in the previous paragraph. The axiom
b5 implements the symmetry of the logical independence. The specific notations ⊢C , ⊢T and
⊢ will be used for denoting a proof in C, T or DmBL/DmBL∗ respectively. The following
section studies the logical consequences of the axioms.
3 Logical theorems and comparison with other systems
DmBL/DmBL∗ implies the classical and the T-system tautologies; the properties of classical
logic and of the T-system are assumed without proof. Since both DmBL and DmBL∗ are
studied, the possibly needed axioms b5∗ are indicated in bracket.
3.1 Theorems
The proofs are done in appendix A. Next theorem is proved here as an example.
The full universe. ⊢ ✷φ→ (ψ × φ) . In particular (ψ|⊤) ≡ ψ .
Interpretation: a tautology is independent with any other proposition and its sub-universe is
the whole universe.
Proof. From axiom b3, it comes ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) and ⊢ (¬ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ¬ψ) .
Then ⊢ φ→
(
(ψ|φ)→ ψ
)
and ⊢ φ→
(
(¬ψ|φ)→ ¬ψ
)
.
Applying b4 yields ⊢ φ→
(
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
)
.
It follows ⊢ ✷φ→ ✷
(
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
)
.
The remaining proof is obvious.
✷✷✷
Axioms order. Axiom b5 implies b5.weak.A.
The empty universe [b5.weak.A]. ⊢ ✷¬φ→ (ψ × φ) . In particular (ψ|⊥) ≡ ψ .
Left equivalences. ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
(
✷¬φ ∨ ✷
(
(ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ)
))
.
Corollary [b5.weak.A]. ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
(
(ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ)
)
.
Corollary 2 [b5.weak.A]. ψ ≡ η implies (ψ|φ) ≡ (η|φ).
Proof is immediate from corollary.
Sub-universes are classical [b5.weak.A].
• (¬ψ|φ) ≡ ¬(ψ|φ) ,
• (ψ ∧ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ) ,
• (ψ ∨ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∨ (η|φ) ,
• (ψ → η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ)→ (η|φ) .
Evaluating (⊤|·) and (⊥|·) [b5.weak.A]. Is proved ⊢ ✷ψ → ✷(ψ|φ) . In particular
(⊤|φ) ≡ ⊤ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ .
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Inference property. (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ .
Introspection. ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨ ✷(φ|φ) .
Interpretation: a non-empty proposition sees itself as ever true.
Notice that this property is compliant with (⊥|⊥) ≡ ⊥ .
Inter-independence [b5.weak.A]. ⊢ (ψ|φ) × φ .
Interpretation: a proposition is independent of its sub-universe.
Independence invariance [b5.weak.A].
⊢ (ψ × φ)→ (¬ψ × φ) ,
⊢
(
(ψ × φ) ∧ (η × φ)
)
→
(
(ψ ∧ η)× φ
)
,
⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
(
(ψ × φ)↔ (η × φ)
)
.
Narcissistic independence. ⊢ (φ× φ)→ (✷¬φ ∨✷φ) .
Interpretation: a proposition independent with itself is either a tautology or a contradiction.
Independence and proof [b5.weak.A]. ⊢ (ψ × φ)→
(
✷(φ ∨ ψ)→ (✷φ ∨ ✷ψ)
)
.
Interpretation: when propositions are independent and their disjunctions are sure, then at
least one proposition is sure.
Independence and regularity [b5.weak.A].
⊢
(
(φ× η) ∧ (ψ × η)
)
→
(
✷
(
(φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η)
)
→
(
✷¬η ∨ ✷(φ→ ψ)
))
.
Interpretation: unless it is empty, a proposition may be removed from a logical equation,
when it appears in the both sides and is independent with the equation components.
Corollary. ⊢ φ× η , ⊢ ψ × η , ⊢ ✸η and φ ∧ η ≡ ψ ∧ η implies φ ≡ ψ .
Corollary 2. Being given ψ and φ such that ⊢ ✸φ, the proposition (ψ|φ) is uniquely defined
as the solution of equation X ∧ φ ≡ ψ ∧ φ (with unknown X) which is independent of φ.
Right equivalences [b5]. ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
(
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
)
(proved with b5 but without
b5.weak.B).
Interpretation: equivalence is compliant with the conditioning.
Corollary. Axiom b5 implies b5.weak.B. In particular, DmBL∗ is weaker than DmBL.
Corollary of b5 or b5.weak.B. ψ ≡ η implies (φ|ψ) ≡ (φ|η).
Together with the properties of the system T and left equivalences, this last result implies
that the equivalence relation ≡ is compliant with the logical operators of DmBL/DmBL∗. In
particular, replacing a sub-proposition with an equivalent sub-proposition within a theorem
still makes a theorem.
Reduction rule [b5]. Axiom b5 implies
(
φ
∣∣(ψ|φ)) ≡ φ .
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Markov Property [b5].
⊢
((
t−2∧
τ=1
(
(φt|φt−1)× φτ
))
∧✸
(
t−1∧
τ=1
φτ
))
−→ ✷
(
(φt|φt−1)↔
(
φt
∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∧
τ=1
φτ
))
.
Interpretation: the Markov property holds, when the conditioning is independent of the past
and the past is possible.
Link between
(
(η|ψ)
∣∣φ) and (η|φ ∧ ψ) [b5].
It is derived:
(
(η|ψ)
∣∣φ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ ≡ (η|ψ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ ψ ∧ η ≡ (η|φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (φ ∧ ψ) .
This is a quite limited result and it is tempting to assume the additional axiom “
(
(η|ψ)
∣∣φ) ≡
(η|φ∧ψ) (∗)” . There is a really critical point here, since axiom (∗) implies actually a logical
counterpart to Lewis’ triviality :
Let
(
(η|ψ)
∣∣φ) ≡ (η|φ ∧ ψ) (∗) be assumed as an axiom.
Then ⊢ ✸(φ ∧ ψ)→
(
✷(φ↔ ψ) ∨ (φ × ψ)
)
.
Interpretation: if φ and ψ are not exclusive and not equivalent, then they are independent.
This is irrelevant and forbids the use of axiom (∗).
3.2 Some comparisons with other systems
Conditional Event Algebra. As explained in introduction, CEAs characterize the con-
ditional by means of an external operator. The conditional are limited to only one level of
conditioning, but consequently, the combination rules of the conditionals are richer than for
the strict Bayesian conditionals. On the contrary, DmBL handles several level of condition-
ing, but is not addressed to provide richer combinations than the strict Bayesian conditionals.
Thus, DmBL implements the necessary Bayesian properties:
• In DmBL, the conditioning constitutes a Boolean morphism (sub-universes are classi-
cal). The property (4) of the CEA DGNW [21] is thus recovered and generalized,
• The Bayesian inference p(ψ|φ)p(φ) = p(φ ∧ ψ) is derived from the extension of proba-
bility (section 5) by means of the theorems (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ and ⊢ (ψ|φ) × φ .
DGNW also provides the relation (a|b ∧ c) ∧ (b|c) = (a ∧ b|c) , which is related to the general
Bayesian inference p(a|b ∧ c)p(b|c) = p(a ∧ b|c) . The general Bayesian inference is a direct
consequence of the Bayesian inference, and thus can be derived from DmBL too. But is there
a logical counterpart in DmBL to the general Bayesian inference? This logical counterpart
would be expressed by means of a double proposition:
⊢ (η|φ ∧ ψ)× (ψ|φ) and (η|φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ψ|φ) ≡ (ψ ∧ η|φ) .
At this time, we are not able to decide if these propositions are derived from DmBL or are
even compatible with DmBL.
Comparison with an existing conditional logic. The axioms of the conditional logic
VCU (VCU is an abbreviation for the axioms system) [28] are considered here and compared
to DmBL. This example is representative of the difference with the other conditional logics.
Theorems derived in section 3.1 are referred to.
Axioms and rules of VCU:
(Ax.1) φ > φ has a partial counterpart in DmBL, i.e. ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷(φ|φ) (theorem).
(Ax.2) (¬φ > φ)→ (ψ > φ) becomes ⊢ (φ|¬φ)→ (φ|ψ) (derived from theorems).
(Ax.3) (φ > ¬ψ) ∨ (((φ ∧ ψ) > ξ)↔ (φ > (ψ → ξ))) has no obvious counterpart in DmBL.
12
(Ax.4) (φ > ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) is exactly b3.
(Ax.5) (φ ∧ ψ)→ (φ > ψ) is a subcase of φ ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ (ψ|φ) (inference theorem).
(Ax.6) (¬φ > φ) →
(
¬(¬φ > φ) > (¬φ > φ)
)
becomes ⊢ (φ|¬φ) →
(
(φ|¬φ)
∣∣¬(φ|¬φ))
(derived from theorems).
(CR) Counterfactual rule. This is a multiple-task rule. First, it allows the introduction of
tautologies inside a conditional, secondly, it implies some linearity of the conditional with ∧ :
Being proved (ξ1∧. . .∧ξn)→ ψ , it is proved ((φ > ξ1)∧. . .∧(φ > ξn))→ (φ > ψ) .
This rule is recovered in DmBL from the fact that sub-universes are classical :
⊢ (ξ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ξn)→ ψ implies ⊢ ((ξ1|φ) ∧ . . . ∧ (ξn|φ))→ (ψ|φ) .
It is noteworthy that Ax.1 and CR, with n = 1 and ξ1 = φ, infer the rule:
Being proved φ→ ψ, it is proved φ > ψ . (17)
It appears that Ax.2, Ax.4, Ax.5, Ax.6 and CR are recovered in DmBL, Ax.1 is weakened in
DmBL and Ax.3 is not implemented in DmBL.
Conversely, b3 is implemented by VCU. b2 is not implemented by VCU, but it could be
shown that VCU completed by b4 implies b2. b4 is not implemented by VCU. b1 is obtained
from (17), while weakened by ✷¬φ. b5 is related to the notion of logical independence, which
is not considered within VCU. Then we have to point out three fundamental distinctions of
DmBL compared to VCU:
1. In DmBL, the negation commutes with the conditional (b4). More generally, sub-
universes are classical in DmBL,
2. In DmBL, the deductions on the conditionals are often weakened by the hypothesis that
the condition is not empty; for example, ✷¬φ in rule b1, or theorem ⊢ (φ|φ) ∨ ✷¬φ ,
3. DmBL manipulates a notion of logical independence of the propositions.
In fact, point 1 (commutation of the negation) makes point 2 (deduction weakened by the
non-empty condition hypothesis) necessary. For example, ⊥ > ⊤ is derived from (17); by
using both Ax.1 and the negation commutation, it is then deduced:
⊤ ≡ ⊥ > ⊥ ≡ ⊥ > ¬⊤ ≡ ¬(⊥ > ⊤) ≡ ¬⊤ ≡ ⊥ , (18)
which is impossible. Notice that this deduction is also done in DmBL, if we replace the
“weakened” theorem ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨ ✷(φ|φ) by the “strong” theorem ⊢ (φ|φ) .
This example, based on VCU and DmBL, illustrates a fundamental difference between DmBL
and other conditional logics. DmBL considers ⊥ as a singularity, and will be cautious with
this case when inferring conditionals. This principle is not just a logical artifact. In fact,
it is also deeply related to the notion of logical independence, as it appears in the proof of
theorem Independence and proof.
4 Models
4.1 Toward a Model
In this paragraph, it is discussed about the link between Kripke models [6, 19, 20] for
DmBL/DmBL∗ and a more basic structure called conditional models.
From now on, P(W ) denotes the set of all subsets of set W .
Definition. A Kripke model for DmBL (respectively DmBL∗) is a quadruplet (W,R,H, f),
where W is a set of worlds, R ⊂ W ×W is an accessibility relation, H : L −→ P(W ) is an
assignment function, f : H(L)×H(L) −→ P(W ) is a conditioning function, and verifying:
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• H(¬φ) =W \H(φ) and H(φ→ ψ) =
(
W \H(φ)
)
∪H(ψ) ,
• H(✷φ) =
{
t ∈ W
/
∀u ∈ W, (t, u) ∈ R⇒ u ∈ H(φ)
}
,
• H
(
(ψ|φ)
)
= f
(
H(ψ), H(φ)
)
,
• H(φ) =W for any φ such that ⊢ φ is an axiom of the form m3, b1, b2, b3, b4,
or b5 (respectively b5.weak.A and b5.weak.B).
It is noticed that the rules and axioms c∗, modus ponens, m1 and m2 and are compliant with
the model by construction.
Definition 2. A conditional model for DmBL (respectively DmBL∗) is a quadruplet (W,M, h, f)
such that W is a set of worlds, M ⊂ P(W ) is a set of admissible propositions, h : Θ −→ M
is an assignment function, f :M ×M −→M is a conditioning function, and verifying:
• M is a Boolean sub-algebra of P(W ), i.e. A∩B ∈M andW \A ∈M for any A,B ∈M ,
β1. A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply f(B,A) =W , for any A,B ∈M ,
β2. f(B ∪C,A) ⊂ f(B,A) ∪ f(C,A) , for any A,B,C ∈M ,
β3. A ∩ f(B,A) ⊂ B , for any A,B ∈M ,
β4. f(W \B,A) =W \ f(B,A) , for any A,B ∈M ,
β5. f(B,A) = B implies f(A,B) = A
(respectively β5w. f(B,A) = B implies f(B,W \A) = B) , for any A,B ∈M) .
Remarks. A conditional model does not implement the modalities. In both models, the
function f is the representation of the conditional (|) .
Model transfer. Let (W,M, h, f) be a conditional model for DmBL (respectively DmBL∗).
Let R =W ×W and define H by:
• H(θ) = h(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ ,
• H(¬φ) =W \H(φ) and H(φ→ ψ) =
(
W \H(φ)
)
∪H(ψ) ,
• H(φ) =W ⇒ H(✷φ) =W and H(φ) 6=W ⇒ H(✷φ) = ∅ ,
• H
(
(ψ|φ)
)
= f
(
H(ψ), H(φ)
)
.
Then (W,R,H, f) is a Kripke model for DmBL (respectively DmBL∗).
The proof is easy, but tedious. It is detailed in appendix B.
Conditional models are defined from the classical and conditional operators only. In fact,
such models have been set first for a non-modal construction of the Bayesian logic [12]. In
this paper a free conditional model is constructed for DmBL∗ , with completeness results.
The conditional model is translated into a DmBL∗ Kripke model. The derived model is
of course not complete for DmBL∗ in regards to the modalities, but the completeness still
holds in regards to the conditional operator. The model transfer property also suggests that
the conditional operator is not constructed from the modal operator: it is even possible to
construct (|) when ✷ is trivial in the model (R =W ×W implies H(φ) =W or H(✷φ) = ∅) .
In section 5, a model for DmBL is also derived but not constructed. This model of DmBL is
non-trivial (it is possible to extend any unconditioned probability over this model), but no
completeness result is provided.
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4.2 Construction of a free conditional model for DmBL∗
In the sequel, Θ is assumed to be finite. A free conditional model for DmBL∗ will be
constructed as a limit of partial models. These models are constructed recursively, based on
the iteration of (|) on any propositions.
4.2.1 Definition of partial models
In this section are constructed a sequence (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn)n∈IN and a sequence of one-to-
one morphisms (µn)n∈IN such that:
• Mn is a Boolean sub-algebra of P(Ωn), hn : Θ → Mn and fn : Mn ×Mn → Mn , (fn
will be partially defined)
• µn :Mn →Mn+1 is such that µn(A∩B) = µn(A)∩µn(B), µn(Ωn \A) = Ωn+1 \µn(A)
and ∀θ ∈ Θ, hn+1(θ) = µn
(
hn(θ)
)
, (as a consequence, µn is a Boolean morphism)
• For any A,B ∈ Mn such that fn(B,A) is defined, then fn+1
(
µn(B), µn(A)
)
is defined
and fn+1
(
µn(B), µn(A)
)
= µn
(
fn(B,A)
)
,
• Λn is a list of elements of Mn, which is used as a task list of the construction (refer to
the subsequent paragraphs).
Remark. The functions fn represent the partial construction of (|) . The morphisms µn
characterize the “inclusion” of the partial models.
In a subsequent section, a conditional model
(
Ω∞,M∞, h∞, f∞
)
will be defined as the limit
of (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn)n∈IN associated to (µn)n∈IN .
Notations and definitions. For any A ∈Mn, it is defined ∼ A = Ωn \A .
Any singleton {ω} may be denoted ω if the context is not ambiguous.
For any m > n and A ∈Mn , it is defined A[m] = µm−1 ◦ . . . ◦ µn(A) .
The Cartesian product of sets A and B is denoted A×B ; the functions id and T are defined
over pairs by id(x, y) = (x, y) and T (x, y) = (y, x) ; for a set of pairs C, the abbreviation
(id ∪ T )(C) = id(C) ∪ T (C) is also used.
Initialization. Define (Ω0,M0, h0, f0,Λ0) by:
• Ω0 = {0, 1}Θ,
• M0 = P(Ω0),
• ∀θ ∈ Θ, h0(θ) =
{
(δτ )τ∈Θ ∈ Ω0
/
δθ = 1
}
,
• f0(A, ∅) = f0(A,Ω0) = A for any A ∈M0 ,
• Λ0 = (s0, f0, λ0) is a list defined by s0 = 0, f0 = card(M0) − 2 and λ0 is a one-to-one
mapping from [[s0, f0 − 1]] to M0 \ {∅,Ω0} , such that λ0(2t) =∼ λ0(2t+ 1) , ∀t .
Step n to step n+ 1.
Let (Ωk,Mk, hk, fk,Λk)0≤k≤n and the one-to-one morphisms (µk)0≤k≤n−1 be constructed.
Notice that λn(sn) =∼ λn(sn + 1) by construction of Λn .
Define bn = λn(sn) .
Then, construct the set In and the sequences Γn(i),Πn(i)|i∈In according to the cases:
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Case 0. There is m < n such that {bm[n],∼ bm[n]} = {bn,∼ bn} .
Then, notice that bn = bm[n] by the subsequent construction of Λ .
Let ν be the greatest of such m; then define In = µν(bν)× ∼ µν(bν) ,
Πn(ω, ω
′) = fn(ω
′
[n],∼ bn) ∩ ω[n] and Γn(ω, ω
′) = fn(ω[n], bn) ∩ ω
′
[n] for any (ω, ω
′) ∈ In .†
†Remark: case 0 means that the construction of f(·, bn) and of f(·,∼ bn) has already begun
over the propositions of Mν+1.
Case 1. Case 0 does not hold;
Define In = {bn} , Πn(i) = i and Γn(i) =∼ i for any i ∈ In .
Remark: case 1 means that f(·, bn) and f(·,∼ bn) are constructed for the first time.
Setting. (Ωn+1,Mn+1, hn+1, fn+1,Λn+1) and µn are defined by:
• µn(A) =
⋃
i∈In
(((
A ∩ Πn(i)
)
× Γn(i)
)
∪
((
A ∩ Γn(i)
)
×Πn(i)
))
for any A ∈Mn ,
• Ωn+1 = µn(Ωn) ,
• ∀θ ∈ Θ, hn+1(θ) = µn
(
hn(θ)
)
,
• Mn+1 = P(Ωn+1) ,
• fn+1(A, ∅) = fn+1(A,Ωn+1) = A for any A ∈Mn+1 ,
• For any A ∈ Mn \ {bn,∼ bn, ∅,Ωn} and any B ∈ Mn such that fn(B,A) is defined,
then fn+1
(
µn(B), µn(A)
)
is defined and fn+1
(
µn(B), µn(A)
)
= µn
(
fn(B,A)
)
,
• For any A ∈Mn+1 , set fn+1
(
A, µn(bn)
)
= (id ∪ T )
(
A ∩
(⋃
i∈In
(
Πn(i)× Γn(i)
)))
and fn+1
(
A,∼ µn(bn)
)
= (id ∪ T )
(
A ∩
(⋃
i∈In
(
Γn(i)×Πn(i)
)))
,
• Λn+1 = (sn+1, fn+1, λn+1) is such that:
– sn+1 = sn + 2 = 2n+ 2, fn+1 = sn+1 + card(Mn+1)− 2 ,
– λn+1 is a one-to-one mapping from [[sn+1, fn+1 − 1]] to Mn+1 \ {∅,Ωn+1} ,
– λn+1(t) = µn
(
λn(t)
)
for any t ∈ [[sn+1, fn − 1]] ,
– λn+1(2t) =∼ λn+1(2t+ 1) , ∀t and λn+1(fn+1 − 2) = µn(bn) .
This definition ensures a cyclic and full construction of f(·, bn) and f(·,∼ bn).4
The first steps of the model construction are illustrated by a simple example in appendix F.
Short explanation of the model. In fact, (ω, ω′) ∈ Πn(i)× Γn(i) should be interpreted
as ω∧ (ω′|¬bn), while (ω
′, ω) ∈ Γn(i)×Πn(i) should be interpreted as ω
′∧ (ω|bn). The reader
should compare this construction to the proof of completeness in appendix D for a better
comprehension of the mechanisms of the model.
4In regards to the mapping µ, the list Λn+1 is the list Λn plus any propositions of Mn+1 \ {∅,Ωn+1}
which are not/no more listed in Λn .
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4.2.2 Properties of (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn, µn)n∈IN
It is proved recursively:
•µ µn :Mn →Mn+1 is a one-to-one Boolean morphism,
•f If A,B ∈Mn and fn(B,A) is defined, then fn+1
(
µn(B), µn(A)
)
= µn
(
fn(B,A)
)
,
β˜1. Let A,B ∈Mn such that fn(B,A) is defined.
Then A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply fn(B,A) = Ωn ,
β˜2. Let A,B,C ∈Mn such that fn(B,A), fn(C,A) and fn(B ∪ C,A) are defined.
Then fn(B ∪ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∪ fn(C,A) ,
β˜3. Let A,B ∈Mn such that fn(B,A) is defined.
Then A ∩ fn(B,A) = A ∩B ,
β˜4. Let A,B ∈Mn such that fn(B,A) and fn(∼ B,A) are defined.
Then fn(∼ B,A) =∼ fn(B,A) ,
β˜5w. Let A,B ∈Mn such that fn(B,A) and fn(B,∼ A) are defined.
Then fn(B,A) = B implies fn(B,∼ A) = B .
Proofs are given in appendix C.
4.2.3 Limit
The limit
(
Ω∞,M∞, h∞, f∞
)
is defined as follows:
• Set Ω∞ =
{
(ωn|n∈IN) ∈
∏
n∈IN
Ωn
/
∀n ∈ IN, ωn+1 ∈ µn(ωn)
}
;
Useful definitions:
– For any n ∈ IN and any A ∈Mn , A∞ =
{
(ωk|k∈IN) ∈ Ω∞
/
ωn ∈ A
}
. The subset
A∞ is a mapping of A within Ω∞ . It is noticed that this mapping is invariant
with µ, i.e. (A[m])∞ = A∞ for m > n ,
– For any n ∈ IN ,Mn:∞ =
{
A∞
/
A ∈Mn
}
. The structureMn:∞ is an isomorphic
mapping of the structure Mn within Ω∞ . It is noticed that (Mn:∞|n∈IN) is a
monotonic sequence, i.e. Mn:∞ ⊂Mn+1:∞ ,
• Set M∞ =
⋃
n∈IN
Mn:∞ ,
• Set h∞(θ) =
(
h0(θ)
)
∞
for any θ ∈ Θ ,
• Let A,B ∈ M∞ . Then there is n and a, b ∈ Mn such that A = a∞ , B = b∞ and
fn(b, a) is defined (subsequent proposition). Set f∞(B,A) =
(
fn(b, a)
)
∞
.
This definition is justified by the following propositions:
Proposition 1. For any n ∈ IN, m > n and A ∈Mn, (A[m])∞ = A∞ .
Proof. By definition of Ω∞,
(A[m])∞ =
{
(ωk|k∈IN) ∈ Ω∞
/
ωm ∈ A[m]
}
=
{
(ωk|k∈IN) ∈ Ω∞
/
ωn ∈ A
}
= A∞ .
✷✷✷
Corollary Mn:∞ ⊂Mn+1:∞ .
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Proposition 2. Mn:∞ is a Boolean subalgebra of P(Ω∞) and is isomorph to Mn by the
morphism A 7→ A∞. As a consequence, M∞ is a Boolean subalgebra of P(Ω∞) .
Proof is obvious from the definition of Mn:∞ .
From now on, Mn will be considered as a subalgebra of P(Ω∞).
Proposition 3. Let A,B ∈ M∞ . Then there is n and a, b ∈ Mn such that A = a∞ ,
B = b∞ and fn(b, a) is defined.
Proof. Since (Mk:∞|k∈IN) is a monotonic sequence , there is m ∈ IN such that A,B ∈Mm:∞ .
Let a, b ∈Mm be such that A = a∞ and B = b∞ .
By definition of the list Λm, there is p ∈ [[sm, fm − 1]] such that λp = a .
As a consequence, fp+1(b[p+1], a[p+1]) exists.
But then hold A = (a[p+1])∞ and B = (b[p+1])∞ .
Finally n = p+ 1 answers to the proposition.
✷✷✷
Proposition 4. The definition of f∞ does not depend on the choice of n.
Proof. Let n, m > n, a, b ∈Mn and c, d ∈Mm such that A = a∞ = c∞ and B = b∞ = d∞ .
Assume also that fn(b, a) and fm(d, c) exist.
Then (a[m])∞ = c∞ and (b[m])∞ = d∞.
Since Mm and Mm:∞ are isomorph, it follows a[m] = c and b[m] = d .
But it is derived from •f that fm(b[m], a[m]) = fn(b, a)[m] .
Finally
(
fn(b, a)
)
∞
=
(
fm(d, c)
)
∞
.
✷✷✷
Proposition 5.
(
Ω∞,M∞, h∞, f∞
)
verifies β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5w.
The properties β∗ are inherited from Mn, fn|n∈IN , by means of the properties β˜∗.
Conclusion.
(
Ω∞,M∞, h∞, f∞
)
is a conditional model for DmBL∗.
4.2.4 Implied Kripke model for DmBL∗
By means of the Model transfer property, a Kripke model for DmBL∗ is derived from(
Ω∞,M∞, h∞, f∞
)
. This Kripke model is denoted B =
(
Ω∞, RB, HB, f∞
)
.
4.2.5 Completeness for the conditional operator
It is above the scope of this work to construct a model of DmBL∗, which is complete for
both the modal and the conditional operators. However, it is shown here that B is a model
of DmBL∗, which is complete for the conditional operator.
Proposition 1. By construction, (Ω∞, HB) is a complete model for the classical logic C,
when HB is restricted to the propositions of LC .
Proposition 2. Let φ ∈ L be a proposition constructed without ✷ or ✸ . Then ⊢ φ in
DmBL∗ if and only if HB(φ) = Ω∞ .
Proof is done in appendix D .
Proposition 2 expresses that B is complete for the conditional operator.
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4.3 Coherence properties
The model B clearly shows that DmBL∗ is coherent. It also demonstrates that the conditional
operator (|) is not trivial. Since (Ω∞, HB) is a complete model for C, DmBL∗ is an extension
of the classical logic: ⊢ φ implies ⊢C φ, for any φ ∈ LC . But a stronger property holds:
Non-distortion. Let φ ∈ LC . Assume that ⊢ ✷φ∨✷¬φ in DmBL∗. Then ⊢C φ or ⊢C ¬φ.
Interpretation: DmBL∗ does not “distort” the classical propositions. More precisely, a prop-
erty like ⊢ ✷φ ∨ ✷¬φ would add some knowledge about φ, since it says that either φ or ¬φ
is “sure”. But the non-distortion just tells that such property is impossible unless there is a
trivial knowledge about φ within the classical logic.
Proof. Assume ⊢ ✷φ ∨ ✷¬φ .
Since B is a model for DmBL∗, it comes HB(✷φ ∨ ✷¬φ) = Ω∞ .
Then HB(✷φ) ∪HB(✷¬φ) = Ω∞ .
Since HB(✷ψ) = ∅ or Ω∞ for any ψ ∈ L , it comes HB(✷φ) = Ω∞ or HB(✷¬φ) = Ω∞ .
At last, HB(φ) = Ω∞ or HB(¬φ) = Ω∞ .
But (Ω∞, HB) is a complete Boolean model for C , which implies ⊢C φ or ⊢C ¬φ .
✷✷✷
Another non-distortion property is derived subsequently in the context of probabilistic DmBL∗.
5 Extension of probability
5.1 Probability over propositions,
a minimal† definition.
† This definition is related to finite probabilities and excludes any Bayesian consideration.
Probabilities are classically defined over measurable sets. However, this is only a manner to
model the notion of probability, which is essentially an additive measure of the belief of logical
propositions [33]. Probability could be defined without reference to the measure theory, at
least when the propositions are countable. The notion of probability is explained now within
a strict propositional formalism. Conditional probabilities are excluded from this definition,
but the notion of independence is considered.
Intuitively, a probability over a space of logical propositions is a measure of belief which is
additive (disjoint propositions are adding their chances) and increasing with the propositions.
This measure should be zeroed for the contradiction and set to 1 for the tautology. Moreover,
a probability is a multiplicative measure for independent propositions.
Definition for classical propositions. A probability π over C is a IR+ valued function
such that for any propositions φ and ψ of LC :
Equivalence. φ ≡C ψ implies π(φ) = π(ψ) ,
Additivity. π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∨ ψ) = π(φ) + π(ψ) ,
Coherence. π(⊥) = 0 ,
Finiteness. π(⊤) = 1 .
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Property. The coherence and additivity imply the increase of π:
Increase. π(φ ∧ ψ) ≤ π(φ) .
Proof. Since φ ≡C (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ) and (φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (φ ∧ ¬ψ) ≡C ⊥, the additivity implies:
π(φ) + π(⊥) = π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∧ ¬ψ) .
From the coherence π(⊥) = 0 , it is deduced π(φ) = π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∧ ¬ψ) .
Since π is non-negatively valued, π(φ) ≥ π(φ ∧ ψ) .
✷✷✷
Definition for DmBL/DmBL∗. In this case, we have to deal with independence notions.
A probability P over DmBL/DmBL∗ is a IR
+ valued function, which verifies (replace ≡C by
≡ and π by P ) equivalence, additivity, coherence, finiteness and:
Multiplicativity. ⊢ φ× ψ implies P (φ ∧ ψ) = P (φ)P (ψ) .
for any propositions φ and ψ of L .
5.2 Probability extension over DmBL∗
Property. Let π be a probability defined over C , the classical logic, such that π(φ) > 0
for any φ 6≡C ⊥. Then, there is a (multiplicative) probability π defined over DmBL∗ such
that π(φ) = π(φ) for any classical proposition φ ∈ LC .
Remark: this is another non-distortion property, since the construction of DmBL∗ puts no
constraint over probabilistic classical propositions.
Proof is done in appendix E.
Corollary. Let π be a probability defined over C . Then, there is a (multiplicative) prob-
ability π defined over DmBL∗ such that π(φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ LC .
Proof. Let Σ =
{∧
θ∈Θ ǫθ
/
ǫ ∈
∏
θ∈Θ{θ,¬θ}
}
.
For any real number e > 0 , define the probability πe over LC by:
∀σ ∈ Σ , πe(σ) =
e
card(Σ)
+ (1− e)π(σ) .
Let πe be the extension of πe over DmBL∗ as constructed in appendix E.
By E.2.3 , there is a rational function Rφ such that πe(φ) = Rφ(e) for any φ ∈ L .
Now 0 ≤ Rφ(e) ≤ 1 ; since Rφ(e) is rational and bounded, lime→0+Rφ(e) exists.
Define π(φ) = lime→0+ Rφ(e) , for any φ ∈ L.
The additivity, coherence, finiteness and multiplicativity are obviously inherited by π.
At last, it is clear that π(σ) = π(σ) for any σ ∈ Σ .
✷✷✷
5.3 Model and probability extension for DmBL
Let K be the set of all (multiplicative) probabilities P over DmBL∗ such that P (φ) > 0 for
any φ 6≡ ⊥ , and define the sequences K(φ) = (P (φ))P∈K for any φ ∈ L .
Then define LK = K(L) =
{
K(φ)
/
φ ∈ L
}
; The space LK is thus a subset of IR
+K .
The operators ¬, ∧ and (|) are canonically implied over LK :5
¬K(φ) = K(¬φ) , K(φ) ∧ K(ψ) = K(φ ∧ ψ) and
(
K(ψ)
∣∣K(φ)) = K((ψ|φ)) .
5The operators ∨ and → are derived from ∧ and ¬ as usually; modalities are not considered.
20
Since any P ∈ K verifies the equivalence property, it comes K(φ) = K(ψ) when φ ≡ ψ in
DmBL∗. As a direct consequence,
(
LK,¬,∧, (|)
)
is a conditional-like model of DmBL∗ (the
structure is a Boolean algebra but not derived from set operators. This is the only difference
with conditional models).
Property.
(
LK,¬,∧, (|)
)
is a conditional-like model of DmBL.
Proof. Let P ∈ K ; P is multiplicative.
Since ⊢ (ψ|φ)×φ and (ψ|φ)∧φ ≡ ψ∧φ in DmBL∗, it comes P
(
(ψ|φ)
)
P (φ) = P (ψ∧φ) .
Now assume
(
K(ψ)
∣∣K(φ)) = K(ψ) , with ψ 6≡ ⊥ .
Then K
(
(ψ|φ)
)
= K(ψ), and P
(
(ψ|φ)
)
= P (ψ) for any P ∈ K .
Then P (φ) = P (ψ∧φ)
P
(
(ψ|φ)
) = P (ψ∧φ)
P (ψ) = P
(
(φ|ψ)
)
for any P ∈ K ,
and
(
K(φ)
∣∣K(ψ)) = K((φ|ψ)) = K(φ) .
Since moreover (φ|⊥) ≡ φ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ in DmBL∗, the model verifies β5 .
✷✷✷
Notice that it was only needed the equivalence and multiplicative properties for the elements
of K . It is thus possible to construct a more general model by relaxing K .
Probability extension. For any K(φ) ∈ LK and any P ∈ K , define the IR
+-valued map-
ping P̂
(
K(φ)
)
= P (φ) (this mapping, a projection, is indeed well defined).
By construction, P̂ is naturally a multiplicative probability over LK . Moreover, the prob-
ability extensions defined in appendix E are also elements of K . As a consequence, the
deductions of section 5.2 are still working for LK . The extension property is thus derived:
Let π be a probability defined overC . Then, there is a (multiplicative) probability
π defined over DmBL such that π(φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ LC .
Non-distortion. Let φ be a classical proposition. Assume that ⊢ ✷φ ∨ ✷¬φ in DmBL.
Then ⊢C φ or ⊢C ¬φ.
Proof. Consider the Kripke model for DmBL derived from the conditional model
(
LK,¬,∧, (|)
)
.
In this model, the value of H(✷φ) is either K(⊥) or K(⊤) .
Then, H(✷φ ∨ ✷¬φ) = K(⊤) implies H(✷φ) = K(⊤) or H(✷¬φ) = K(⊤) .
Then H(φ) = K(⊤) or H(¬φ) = K(⊤) .
It follows ∀P ∈ K , P (φ) = 1 or ∀P ∈ K , P (¬φ) = 1 , and by the probability extension:
∀π , π(φ) = 1 or ∀π , π(¬φ) = 1 , where π denotes any probability over C .
At last, ⊢C φ or ⊢C ¬φ .
✷✷✷
5.4 Properties of the conditional
Bayes inference. Assume a (multiplicative) probability P defined over DmBL/DmBL∗.
Define P (ψ|φ) as an abbreviation for P
(
(ψ|φ)
)
. Then:
P (ψ|φ)P (φ) = P (φ ∧ ψ) .
Proof. A consequence of (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ and ⊢ (ψ|φ) × φ .
✷✷✷
As a corollary, it is also deduced P
(
(ψ|φ)
∣∣(η|ζ))P (η|ζ) = P ((ψ|φ)∧(η|ζ)) . It is recalled that
the closure of CEA DGNW fails on this relation (refer to the introduction).
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About Lewis’ triviality. The previous extension theorems have shown that for any prob-
ability π defined over C , it is possible to construct a (multiplicative) probability π over
DmBL which extends π. This result by itself shows that DmBL avoids Lewis’ triviality. But
a deeper explanation seems necessary.
Assume φ ∈ LC and define the probability πφ over C by πφ = π(·|φ) . Let πφ be the extension
of πφ over DmBL. It happens that πφ 6= π(·|φ) , which implies that Lewis’ triviality does not
work anymore. It is noticed that although π(·|φ) is a probability over DmBL in the classical
meaning (it is additive, coherent and finite), it is not necessarily multiplicative.
Conditional probabilities do not maintain the logical independence and the con-
ditioning.
This limitation is unavoidable: otherwise the derivation (1) of the triviality is possible, even
if (ψ|φ) is not equivalent to a classical proposition.
6 Conclusion
In this contribution, the conditional logics DmBL and DmBL∗, a slight relaxation of DmBL,
have been defined and studied. These logics have been introduced as an abstraction and
extrapolation of general probabilistic properties. DmBL and DmBL∗ implement the essential
ingredients of the Bayesian inference, including the classical nature to the sub-universe, the
inference property and a related concept of logical independence. For this reason, DmBL
and DmBL∗ extend and refine the existing logical approaches of the Bayesian inference.
The logics are coherent and non-trivial. A model has been constructed for the logic DmBL∗,
which is complete in regards to the conditionals. It has been shown that any probability
over the classical propositions could be extended to DmBL/DmBL∗, in compliance with
the independence relation. Then, the probabilistic Bayesian rule has been recovered from
DmBL/DmBL∗.
There are still many open questions. For example, it is certainly possible to bring some
enrichment to the conditional of DmBL, by means of additional axioms. Is it possible to
recover some specific equivalences of other existing systems? From the strict logical viewpoint,
the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic offers also some interesting properties. For example,
the notion of independence in DmBL have nice logical consequences in the deductions (e.g.
regularity with an inference). This property should be of interest in mathematical logic.
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A Proof: the logical theorems
Axioms order.
From b5, it is deduced ψ × ¬φ ≡ ¬φ× ψ .
Now ¬φ× ψ ≡ ✷
“
(¬φ|ψ)↔ ¬φ
”
≡ ✷
“
¬(φ|ψ)↔ ¬φ
”
≡ ✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ φ
”
≡ φ× ψ by b4.
By applying b5 again, it comes ψ × ¬φ ≡ ψ × φ .
The empty universe.
It is deduced ⊢ ✷¬φ→ (ψ ×¬φ) and then ⊢ ✷¬φ→ (ψ × φ) by b5.weak.A.
The remaining proof is obvious.
Left equivalences.
Proof of the main theorem.
From ⊢ (ψ → η)→
“
φ→ (ψ → η)
”
, it is deduced ⊢ ✷(ψ → η)→ ✷
“
φ→ (ψ → η)
”
.
By applying axiom b1, it comes ⊢ ✷(ψ → η)→
“
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ → η|φ)
”
.
Then axiom b2 implies ⊢ ✷(ψ → η)→
„
✷¬φ ∨✷
“
(ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)
”«
.
Since ψ and η are exchangeable, the theorem is deduced.
Proof of the corollary.
It has been proved ⊢ ✷¬φ→ (ψ × φ), or equivalently ⊢ ✷¬φ→ ✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
.
Of course, also holds ⊢ ✷¬φ→ ✷
“
(η|φ)↔ η
”
.
Then ⊢
“
✷¬φ ∧✷(ψ ↔ η)
”
→ ✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ)
”
.
The corollary is then deduced from the main proposition.
Sub-universes are classical.
The first theorem is a consequence of axiom b4.
From axiom b2 , it is deduced ⊢ (ψ → ¬η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ)→ (¬η|φ)
”
.
It is deduced ⊢
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ ¬(¬η|φ)
”
→ ¬(ψ → ¬η|φ) .
Applying b4, it comes ⊢
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”
→ (ψ ∧ η|φ).
Now ⊢ φ→
“
(ψ ∧ η)→ ψ
”
and b1 imply ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷
“
(ψ ∧ η)→ ψ
˛˛˛
φ
”
.
By b2 it is deduced ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷
“
(ψ ∧ η|φ)→ (ψ|φ)
”
.
It is similarly proved ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷
“
(ψ ∧ η|φ)→ (η|φ)
”
.
At last ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷
„
(ψ ∧ η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”«
.
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Now it has been shown ⊢ ✷¬φ → ✷
“
(Ξ|φ) ↔ Ξ
”
, and considering Ξ = ψ, η or ψ ∧ η, it is implied
⊢ ✷¬φ→ ✷
„
(ψ ∧ η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”«
.
At last ⊢ ✷
„
(ψ ∧ η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”«
and then ⊢ (ψ ∧ η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”
.
The second theorem is then proved.
Third theorem is a consequence of the first and second theorems.
Last theorem is a consequence of the first and third theorems.
Evaluating (⊤|·) and (⊥|·) .
From ⊢ ✷ψ → ✷(φ→ ψ) and b1, it comes ⊢ ✷ψ →
“
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ|φ)
”
.
Now ⊢ ✷¬φ→ ✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
, and consequently ⊢ ✷ψ → ✷(ψ|φ) .
Inference property.
From b3 it comes ⊢ (¬ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ¬ψ) .
Then ⊢ ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬(¬ψ|φ) and ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ|φ) .
At last ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ)→
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ φ
”
.
Conversely ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) implies ⊢
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ φ
”
→
“
(φ→ ψ) ∧ φ
”
.
Since (φ→ ψ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ , the converse is proved.
Introspection.
Obvious from ⊢ φ→ φ and b1 .
Inter-independence.
It is proved: “
(ψ|φ)
˛˛˛
φ
”
∧ (φ|φ) ≡
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ φ
˛˛˛
φ
”
≡ (φ ∧ ψ|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (φ|φ) .
As a consequence ⊢ (φ|φ)→
„“
(ψ|φ)
˛˛˛
φ
”
↔ (ψ|φ)
«
.
Then ⊢ ✷(φ|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ)× φ
”
.
Now ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷(φ|φ) and ⊢ ✷¬φ→
“
(ψ|φ)× φ
”
from previous results.
At last ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ .
Independence invariance.
First theorem comes from the deduction:
(ψ × φ) ≡ ✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
≡ ✷
“
¬(ψ|φ)↔ ¬ψ
”
≡ ✷
“
(¬ψ|φ)↔ ¬ψ
”
≡ (¬ψ × φ) .
The second theorem is also derived from similar deductions:
⊢ ✷
„“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
∧
“
(η|φ)↔ η
”«
→ ✷
„“
(ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)
”
↔ (ψ ∧ η)
«
and then ⊢ ✷
„“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
∧
“
(η|φ)↔ η
”«
→ ✷
“
(ψ ∧ η|φ)
”
↔ (ψ ∧ η)
”
.
Now, let prove the third theorem.
The Left equivalences theorem implies ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
„“
(ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ)
”
∧ (ψ ↔ η)
«
.
Since ⊢
“
(α↔ β) ∧ (γ ↔ δ)
”
→
“
(α↔ γ)↔ (β ↔ δ)
”
, it is deduced
⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
„“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
↔
“
(η|φ)↔ η
”«
.
At last ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
„
✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
↔ ✷
“
(η|φ)↔ η
”«
.
25
Narcissistic independence.
From ⊢ φ→ φ it is deduced ⊢ ✷¬φ ∨✷(φ|φ) .
From definition, it is derived ⊢ (φ× φ)→ ✷
“
(φ|φ)→ φ
”
and then ⊢ (φ× φ)→
“
✷(φ|φ)→ ✷φ
”
.
It is thus deduced ⊢ (φ× φ)→ (✷¬φ ∨✷φ) .
Independence and proof.
Combining ⊢ (φ ∨ ψ)→ (¬φ→ ψ) with b1 implies ⊢ ✷(φ ∨ ψ)→
“
✷φ ∨✷(ψ|¬φ)
”
.
From b5.weak.A, it comes ⊢ (ψ × φ)→ ✷
“
(ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ
”
.
As a consequence ⊢ (φ× ψ)→
“
✷(φ ∨ ψ)→ (✷φ ∨✷ψ)
”
.
Independence and regularity.
Proof of the main theorem.
It is easy to prove (φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η) ≡ ¬η ∨ (φ→ ψ) .
Then ⊢ ✷
“
(φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η)
”
→ ✷
“
¬η ∨ (φ→ ψ)
”
.
Now ⊢
“
(φ× η) ∧ (ψ × η)
”
→
“
(φ→ ψ)× ¬η
”
, by independence invariance and b5.weak.A.
The proof is achieved by means of the preceding property, independence and proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Assume ⊢ X × φ and ⊢ ✸φ.
Since ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ and ψ ∧ φ ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ φ, it is deduced from X ∧ φ ≡ ψ ∧ φ that X ≡ (ψ|φ).
Right equivalences.
First notice that all previous properties are obtained without b5.weak.B.
From (φ|ψ) ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ ψ, (φ|η) ∧ η ≡ φ ∧ η and ⊢ (ψ ↔ η) →
“
(φ ∧ ψ) ↔ (φ ∧ η)
”
, it is deduced
⊢ (ψ ↔ η)→
„“
(φ|ψ) ∧ ψ
”
↔
“
(φ|η) ∧ η
”«
.
Then ⊢ (ψ ↔ η)→
„“
(φ|ψ) ∧ ψ
”
↔
“
(φ|η) ∧ ψ
”«
and finally:
⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
„“
(φ|ψ) ∧ ψ
”
↔
“
(φ|η) ∧ ψ
”«
.
Now ⊢ (φ|ψ)× ψ and ⊢ (φ|η)× η .
Since ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
„“
η × (φ|η)
”
↔
“
ψ × (φ|η)
”«
, it comes ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
“
(φ|η)× ψ
”
by b5.
Finally ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
 “
(φ|ψ)× ψ
”
∧
“
(φ|η)× ψ
”
∧ ✷
„“
(φ|ψ) ∧ ψ
”
↔
“
(φ|η) ∧ ψ
”«!
.
Applying the regularity, it comes ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→
„
✷¬ψ ∨ ✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
”«
.
Now ⊢ ✷(ψ ↔ η)→ (✷¬ψ ↔ ✷¬η) and ⊢ ✷¬Ξ→ ✷
“
(φ|Ξ)↔ φ
”
for Ξ = ψ or η.
It is deduced ⊢
“
✷¬ψ ∧ ✷(ψ ↔ η)
”
→ ✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
”
, thus completing the proof.
Reduction rule.
Since ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ, b5 implies ⊢ φ× (ψ|φ) and ⊢ ✷
„“
φ
˛˛˛
(ψ|φ)
”
↔ φ
«
.
Markov Property.
Since ⊢ (φt|φt−1)× φt−1, it comes ⊢
“Vt−2
τ=1
“
(φt|φt−1)× φτ
””
→
“Vt−1
τ=1
“
(φt|φt−1)× φτ
””
.
Then ⊢
“Vt−2
τ=1
“
(φt|φt−1)× φτ
””
→
`
(φt|φt−1)×
`Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´´
.
Now, (φt|φt−1) ∧
`Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´
≡
Vt
τ=1 φτ ≡
`
φt
˛˛Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´
∧
`Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´
.
Since ⊢
`
φt
˛˛Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´
×
`Vt−1
τ=1 φτ
´
, the proof is achieved by applying the regularity.
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Link between
(
(η|ψ)
∣∣φ) and (η|φ ∧ ψ).
Proof of the logical counterpart to Lewis’ triviality.
Since ¬(φ→ ψ) ≡ φ ∧ ¬ψ , it is equivalent to prove:
⊢
„
✸(φ ∧ ψ) ∧
“
✸(¬ψ ∧ φ) ∨✸(¬φ ∧ ψ)
”«
→ (φ× ψ) .
Since × is symmetric, it is sufficient to prove ⊢
“
✸(φ ∧ ψ) ∧✸(¬ψ ∧ φ)
”
→ (φ× ψ) .
The introspection property implies ⊢ ✸(φ ∧ ψ)→ ✷(φ ∧ ψ|φ ∧ ψ), denoted (a), and ⊢ ✸(¬ψ ∧ φ)→
✷(¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ) .
It is thus deduced ⊢ ✸(φ ∧ ψ) → ✷
„
(ψ|ψ ∧ φ) ↔
“
(ψ|ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ)
”«
, denoted (b), and
⊢ ✸(¬ψ ∧ φ)→ ✷
„
(ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ)↔
“
(ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ)
”«
.
From the deduction (ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ≡ (⊥|¬ψ ∧ φ) ≡ ⊥, it is derived ⊢ ✸(¬ψ ∧ φ)→
✷
“
(ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ)↔ ⊥
”
, denoted (c).
From the deduction (ψ|ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ) ≡ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ), (a) and (b), it comes ⊢ ✸(φ ∧ ψ)→
✷
“
(ψ|ψ ∧ φ))↔ ⊤
”
, denoted (d).
Now (ψ|φ) ≡
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ ψ
”
∨
“
(ψ|φ) ∧ ¬ψ
”
≡
„“
(ψ|φ)
˛˛˛
ψ
”
∧ ψ
«
∨
„“
(ψ|φ)
˛˛˛
¬ψ
”
∧ ¬ψ
«
, and by
applying axiom (∗), (ψ|φ) ≡
“
(ψ|φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ψ
”
∨
“
(ψ|φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ ¬ψ
”
.
Then ⊢
“
✸(¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧✸(φ ∧ ψ)
”
→ ✷
„
(ψ|φ)↔
“
(⊤ ∧ ψ) ∨ (⊥∧ ¬ψ)
”«
by (c) and (d).
At last ⊢
“
✸(¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧✸(φ ∧ ψ)
”
→ ✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
.
B Proof: model transfer
First notice that the above construction of H is possible for any proposition φ ∈ L, since it is always
obtained H(φ) ∈M .
Now, R =W ×W implies H(✷φ) =
n
t ∈ W
.
∀u ∈W, (t, u) ∈ R⇒ u ∈ H(φ)
o
, so that (W,R,H, f)
is actually a Kripke model.
Let verify the compliance with m3, b1, b2, b3, b4 and b5 (resp. b5.weak.∗).
• Compliance with m3 is obtained from the fact that R is reflexive.
• Proof of H
„
✷(φ→ ψ)→
“
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ|φ)
”«
=W , i.e. compliance with b1.
By definition, H
„
✷(φ→ ψ)→
“
✷¬φ∨✷(ψ|φ)
”«
= H
“
✷(ψ|φ)
”
∪H(✷¬φ)∪
„
W \H
“
✷(φ→ ψ)
”«
.
Cases H
“
✷(φ→ ψ)
”
= ∅ or H(✷¬φ) =W then imply H
„
✷(φ→ ψ)→
“
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ|φ)
”«
=W .
Otherwise H
“
✷(φ→ ψ)
”
6= ∅ and H(✷¬φ) 6=W , thus implying H(φ→ ψ) =W and H(¬φ) 6=W .
It is deduced H(φ) ⊂ H(ψ) and H(φ) 6= ∅ , and then f
“
H(ψ),H(φ)
”
=W by using β1.
Finally H
“
✷(ψ|φ)
”
= W and again H
„
✷(φ→ ψ)→
“
✷¬φ ∨✷(ψ|φ)
”«
=W .
• Proof of H
“
¬(¬ψ|φ)↔ (ψ|φ)
”
=W , i.e. compliance with b4.
It is deduced H
“
(¬ψ|φ)
”
= f
“
H(¬ψ),H(φ)
”
= f
“
W \ H(ψ),H(φ)
”
= W \ f
“
H(ψ),H(φ)
”
=
W \H
“
(ψ|φ)
”
, by using β4.
Then
„
H
“
(¬ψ|φ)
”
∩
“
W \H
“
(ψ|φ)
””«
∪
„“
W \H
“
(¬ψ|φ)
””
∩H
“
(ψ|φ)
”«
=W .
And finally H
“
¬(¬ψ|φ)↔ (ψ|φ)
”
=W .
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• Proof of H
„
(ψ → η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)
”«
=W , i.e. compliance with b2.
By β2, it is deduced H
“
(ψ → η|φ)
”
= f
“
H(ψ → η),H(φ)
”
= f
“
H(¬ψ) ∪H(η),H(φ)
”
⊂ f
“
H(¬ψ),H(φ)
”
∪ f
“
H(η),H(φ)
”
= H
“
(¬ψ|φ)
”
∪H
“
(η|φ)
”
= H
“
¬(ψ|φ)
”
∪H
“
(η|φ)
”
.
Then H
„
(ψ → η|φ)→
“
(ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)
”«
=W .
• Proof of H
“
(ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ)
”
=W , i.e. compliance with b3.
Immediate from β3, i.e. H(φ) ∩ f
“
H(ψ),H(φ)
”
⊂ H(ψ) .
Case DmBL.
• Proof of H
„
✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
↔ ✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ φ
”«
=W , i.e. compliance with b5.
By β5, f
“
H(ψ),H(φ)
”
= H(ψ) if and only if f
“
H(φ),H(ψ)
”
= H(φ) .
Then H
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
=W if and only if H
“
(φ|ψ)↔ φ
”
=W .
As a consequence, H
„
✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”«
= H
„
✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ φ
”«
and the result.
Case DmBL∗.
• Proof of H
„
✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
↔ ✷
“
(ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ
”«
=W , i.e. compliance with b5.weak.A.
By β5w, f
“
H(ψ),H(φ)
”
= H(ψ) if and only if f
“
H(ψ),W \H(φ)
”
= H(ψ) .
Then H
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”
=W if and only if H
“
(ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ
”
=W .
As a consequence, H
„
✷
“
(ψ|φ)↔ ψ
”«
= H
„
✷
“
(ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ
”«
and the result.
• Proof of H
„
✷(ψ ↔ η)→ ✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
”«
=W , i.e. compliance with b5.weak.B.
Assume first H(ψ) 6= H(η) .
It comes H(ψ↔ η) 6=W and H
“
✷(ψ ↔ η)
”
= ∅ .
Assume now H(ψ) = H(η) .
Then H
“
(φ|ψ)
”
= H
“
(φ|η)
”
and H
„
✷
“
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
”«
= H
“
(φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)
”
= W .
At last, both cases imply the result.
C Proof: properties of (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn, µn)n∈IN
To be proved:
•µ µn :Mn → Mn+1 is a one-to-one Boolean morphism ,
•f fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(A)
”
= µn
“
fn(B,A)
”
,
β˜1. A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply fn(B,A) = Ωn ,
β˜2. fn(B ∪ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∪ fn(C,A) ,
β˜3. A ∩ fn(B,A) = A ∩B ,
β˜4. fn(∼ B,A) =∼ fn(B,A) ,
β˜5w. fn(B,A) = B implies fn(B,∼ A) = B ,
being assumed A,B,C ∈Mn , and fn(·, ·) defined for the considered cases.
The proof is recursive and needs to consider the two cases in the definition of (µn, fn) .
The properties β˜∗ are obvious for n = 0, since f0 is only defined by f(A, ∅) = f0(A,Ω0) = A . From
now on, it is assumed that β˜∗ hold true for k ≤ n, and that •µ and •f hold true for k ≤ n− 1 . The
subsequent paragraphs establish the proof of β∗ for n+ 1 and the proof of •µ and •f for n.
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Preliminary remark. It is noticed that β˜2 and β˜4 imply:
β˜6 : fn(B ∩ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∩ fn(C,A) .
C.1 Lemma.S
i∈In
Πn(i) = bn and
S
i∈In
Γn(i) =∼ bn ; in particular, Πn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In .
Moreover Πn(i) ∩ Πn(j) = Γn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In such that i 6= j .
Proof. The proof is obvious for case 1.
Now, let consider case 0.
By definition
S
i∈In
Πn(i) =
“S
ω∈µν(bν )
ω[n]
”
∩
“S
ω′∈∼µν(bν )
fn(ω
′
[n],∼ bn)
”
.
By recursion hypothesis over β˜1 it comes fn(∼ bn,∼ bn) = Ωn .
Then by β˜2 ,
S
i∈In
Πn(i) = bn ∩ fn(∼ bn,∼ bn) = bn ∩ Ωn = bn .
For any ω1, ω2 ∈∼ µν(bν) such that ω1 6= ω2 , it comes by β˜6 (deduced from β˜2 and β˜4) :
fn(ω1[n],∼ bn) ∩ fn(ω2[n],∼ bn) = fn(ω1[n] ∩ ω2[n],∼ bn) = fn(∅,∼ bn) = ∅ .
Finally Πn(i) ∩Πn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In such that i 6= j .
The results are similarly proved for Γn .
✷✷✷
Corollary 1.
µn(bn) = T (∼ µn(bn)) =
[
i∈In
Πn(i)× Γn(i) and ∼ µn(bn) = T (µn(bn)) =
[
i∈In
Γn(i)× Πn(i) .
Corollary 2.
fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
=
“
C ∩ µn(bn)
”
∪
“
T (C)∩ ∼ µn(bn)
”
and
fn+1
“
C,∼ µn(bn)
”
=
“
T (C) ∩ µn(bn)
”
∪
“
C∩ ∼ µn(bn)
”
.
Both corollary are obvious from the definition.
C.2 Proof of •µ
The following properties (whose proofs are immediate) will be useful:
ℓ1. (A ∪ B)× C = (A× C) ∪ (B × C) and A× (B ∪ C) = (A×B) ∪ (A× C) , for any A,B,C ,
ℓ2. (A ∩ B)× C = (A× C) ∩ (B × C) and A× (B ∩ C) = (A×B) ∩ (A× C) , for any A,B,C ,
ℓ3. C ∩D = ∅ implies (C × A) ∩ (D ×B) = (A× C) ∩ (B ×D) = ∅ , for any A,B,C,D ,
ℓ4. (A ∪ B) ∩ (C ∪D) = ∅ implies (A ∩B) ∪ (C ∩D) = (A ∪ C) ∩ (B ∪D) , for any A,B,C,D .
ℓ5. (A ∪ B) ∩ (C ∪D) = ∅ and A ∪ C = B ∪D imply A = B and C = D , for any A,B,C,D .
ℓ6. C ∩D = ∅ implies (C ∪D) \
“
(A ∩ C) ∪ (B ∩D)
”
= (C \A) ∪ (D \ B) , for any A,B,C,D .
Proof of µn(Ωn) = Ωn+1 and µn(∅) = ∅ . Immediate from the definitions.
Proof of µn(A ∩B) = µn(A) ∩ µn(B) . By applying ℓ2, it is deduced:
µn(A ∩ B) =
S
i∈In
 „“
A ∩ Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∩
„“
B ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«!
∪
S
i∈In
 „“
A ∩ Γn(i)
”
×Πn(i)
«
∩
„“
B ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«!
.
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By lemma C.1, and applying ℓ3 and ℓ4, it is deduced:
µn(A ∩ B) =
S
i∈In
 „“
A ∩ Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∪
„“
A ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«!
∩
S
i∈In
 „“
B ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∪
„“
B ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«!
= µn(A) ∩ µn(B) .
Proof of µn(A ∪B) = µn(A) ∪ µn(B) . Obviously deduced from ℓ1.
µn is one-to-one. Assume µn(A) = µn(B) ; then:
S
i∈In
 „“
A ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∪
„“
A ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«!
=
S
i∈In
 „“
B ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∪
„“
B ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«!
.
By lemma C.1, and applying ℓ2, ℓ3 and ℓ5, it is deduced for any i ∈ In :“
A ∩ Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i) =
“
B ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i) and
“
A ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i) =
“
B ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i) .
Finally A ∩Πn(i) = B ∩ Πn(i) and A ∩ Γn(i) = B ∩ Γn(i) for any i ∈ In , and:
A ∩
[
i∈In
“
Πn(i) ∪ Γn(i)
”
= B ∩
[
i∈In
“
Πn(i) ∪ Γn(i)
”
.
A = B is deduced by applying the lemma.
Conclusion. The previous results imply that µn is a one-to-one Boolean morphism.
C.3 Proof of •f
By definition, the result holds true for any A ∈ Mn \ {∅,Ωn, bn,∼ bn} . It is also true for A = ∅
or A = Ωn , since fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(∅)
”
= fn+1
“
µn(B), ∅
”
= µn(B) = µn
“
fn(B, ∅)
”
and similarly
fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(Ωn)
”
= fn+1
“
µn(B),Ωn+1
”
= µn(B) = µn
“
fn(B,Ωn)
”
.
The true difficulties come from the cases A = bn or A =∼ bn .
Subsequently, it is assumed A = bn ; the case A =∼ bn is quite similar.
It comes:
fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(bn)
”
= (id∪T )
 
µn(B)∩
„ [
i∈In
“
Πn(i)×Γn(i)
”«!
= (id∪T )
„ [
i∈In
“
B∩Πn(i)
”
×Γn(i)
«
.
The existence of fn(B, bn) necessary implies the case 0 , and there is C ∈Mν+1 such that B = C[n] .
By recursion hypotheses •µ, it comes B ∩ ω[n] = (C ∩ ω)[n] = ω[n] if ω ∈ C , = ∅ if ω 6∈ C .
Moreover, fn(ω[n], bn) ∩ fn(B, bn) = fn(ω[n] ∩B, bn) = fn(ω[n], bn) if ω ∈ C , = ∅ if ω 6∈ C .
As a consequence
S
i∈In
“
B ∩ Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i) =
S
i∈In
Πn(i)×
“
fn(B, bn) ∩ Γn(i)
”
.
By β˜3, B ∩ ω[n] = B ∩ bn ∩ ω[n] = fn(B, bn) ∩ bn ∩ ω[n] = fn(B, bn) ∩ ω[n] for any ω ∈ µν(bν) .
As a consequence
S
i∈In
“
B ∩ Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i) =
S
i∈In
“
fn(B, bn) ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i) .
By applying the both results, it comes:
fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(bn)
”
=
„ [
i∈In
“
fn(B, bn) ∩Πn(i)
”
× Γn(i)
«
∪
„ [
i∈In
“
fn(B, bn) ∩ Γn(i)
”
× Πn(i)
«
.
And by definition of µn, it is finally deduced fn+1
“
µn(B), µn(bn)
”
= µn
“
fn(B, bn)
”
.
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C.4 Proof of β˜1
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying •f .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A = µn(bn) or A =∼ µn(bn) ; then notice that A 6= ∅ by construction.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ⊂ B ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
Then T
“
µn(bn)
”
⊂ T (B) and by lemma, corollary 1&2:
fn+1
“
B,µn(bn)
”
=
“
B ∩ µn(bn)
”
∪
“
T (B)∩ ∼ µn(bn)
”
= µn(bn)∪ ∼ µn(bn) = Ωn+1 .
C.5 Proof of β˜2
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying •f .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The property is then immediate for A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)} , since T (B1 ∪B2) = T (B1) ∪ T (B2).
C.6 Proof of β˜3
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying •f . The property
is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)}.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
The result is immediate from corollary 2 of lemma.
C.7 Proof of β˜4
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying •f . The property
is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)} .
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1
“
∼ B,µn(bn)
”
=
“
µn(bn) \ B
”
∪
“
∼ µn(bn) \ T (B)
”
.
By ℓ6, fn+1
“
∼ B,µn(bn)
”
=∼
„“
B ∩ µn(bn)
”
∪
“
T (B)∩ ∼ µn(bn)
”«
=∼ fn+1
“
B,µn(bn)
”
.
C.8 Lemma 2.
Let C ∈Mn+1 . Then:
fn+1
„
fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
, µn(bn)
«
= fn+1
„
fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
,∼ µn(bn)
«
= fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
and
fn+1
„
fn+1
“
C,∼ µn(bn)
”
, µn(bn)
«
= fn+1
„
fn+1
“
C,∼ µn(bn)
”
,∼ µn(bn)
«
= fn+1
“
C,∼ µn(bn)
”
.
Proof. The result is derived for fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
; it is quite similar for fn+1
“
C,∼ µn(bn)
”
.
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
=
“
C ∩ µn(bn)
”
∪
“
T (C)∩ ∼ µn(bn)
”
.
Since T
“
fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
””
= fn+1
“
C, µn(bn)
”
by definition, the proof is done by corollary 2.
✷✷✷
Corollary. As a direct consequence, fn+1
“
fn+1(B,A),A
”
= fn+1
“
fn+1(B,A),∼ A
”
= fn+1(B,A) ,
whenever fn+1(B,A) exists.
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C.9 Proof of β˜5w
Assume fn+1(B,A) and fn+1(B,∼ A) exist and fn+1(B,A) = B .
By corollary of lemma 2, fn+1(B,∼ A) = fn+1
“
fn+1(B,A),∼ A
”
= fn+1(B,A) = B .
D Proof: completeness for the conditional operator
To be proved:
Let φ ∈ L be constructed without ✷ or ✸ . Then ⊢ φ in DmBL∗ if and only if HB(φ) = Ω∞ .
From now on, let Lb =
n
φ ∈ L / φ is constructed without ✷ or ✸
o
.
In fact, it will be proved:
(HB)≡ is a Boolean isomorphism between (Lb)≡ and M∞ , (19)
where (Lb)≡ is the set of equivalence classes of Lb and (HB)≡ is inferred from HB .
The proof is based on a recursive construction of Lb similar to the definition of M∞ .
Construction. Assume the sequence (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn, µn)n∈IN being constructed.
The sequence (Ln)n∈IN is defined by:
• L0 = LC ,
• Ln+1 ⊂ Lb is the set generated by Ln, the classical operators, the conditionals (·|φ) and (·|¬φ)
where φ ∈ Ln and HB(φ) = bn .
A set Σn ⊂ (Ln)≡ is called a generating partition of Ln, if it verifies:
∀φ ∈ (Ln)≡ , ∃S ⊂ Σn ,
_
σ∈S
σ = φ and σ ∧ σ′ = ⊥ for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σn such that σ 6= σ
′ .
The following property is proved recursively in the next paragraphs:
There is a generating partition Σn of Ln such that card(Σn) ≤ card(Ωn) . (20)
Since (HB)≡ is by construction an onto morphism from (Ln)≡ to Mn:∞ , (20) implies that (HB)≡ is
a Boolean isomorphism between (Ln)≡ and Mn:∞ .
The cyclic definition of Λn then implies Lb = ∪n∈IN(Ln)≡ and (19) is deduced.
Proof of (20) for n = 0. It is obvious, since (M0:∞,HB) is a complete model for LC .
True for n implies true for n+ 1.
The recursion hypothesis implies that (HB)≡ is an isomorphism between (Ln)≡ and Mn:∞ .
Define then βn ∈ (Ln)≡ such that (HB)≡(βn) = bn .
It is known that
“
(·|βn)
˛˛˛
¬βn
”
= (·|βn) and
“
(·|¬βn)
˛˛˛
βn
”
= (·|¬βn) .
Then, since sub-universes are classical, Σn+1 =
n
σ ∧ (σ′|βn) ∧ (σ
′′|¬βn) / σ, σ
′, σ′′ ∈ Σn
o
\ {⊥} .
Now, denote Bn =
n
σ ∈ Σn
.
σ ∧ βn = σ
o
and Bn =
n
σ ∈ Σn
.
σ ∧ ¬βn = σ
o
.
It comes that (σ′|βn) = (σ
′′|¬βn) = ⊥ for σ
′ ∈ Bn and σ
′′ ∈ Bn .
Moreover σ∧(σ′|βn)∧(σ
′′|¬βn) = ⊥ for σ 6∈ {σ
′, σ′′} ; on the other hand, σ∧(σ|βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn ,
and σ ∧ (σ|¬βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn .
Then, the two construction cases of (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn)n∈IN are considered:
Case 1. Then, Σn+1 =
S
σ∈Bn
S
σ′∈Bn
n
σ∧ (σ′|¬βn), σ
′∧ (σ|βn)
o
, owing to above discussion.
As a consequence, card(Σn+1) ≤ 2card(Bn)card(Bn) = 2card(bn)card(∼ bn) = card(Ωn+1) .
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Case 0. In this case, βn = βν .
Define Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ βν = σ} and Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ ¬βν = σ} .
Define also D[φ] = {σ ∈ Σn/σ ∧ φ = σ} for any φ ∈ (Lν+1)≡ .
From previously, it is know that Σn+1 contains elements of the form σ∧ (σ
′|¬βn) or σ
′ ∧ (σ|βn) with
(σ, σ′) ∈ Bn×Bn ; but the construction at step ν +1 implies additional constraints, to be specified.
Let consider especially the case σ ∧ (σ′|¬βn); case σ
′ ∧ (σ|βn) is quite similar.
Notice that there is (τ, τ ′) ∈ Cν ×Cν such that σ ∈ D[τ ] ∩D[(τ
′|¬βν)] , and (θ, θ
′) ∈ Cν ×Cν such
that σ′ ∈ D[θ] ∩D[(θ′|βν)] .
Now, τ ∧ (τ ′|¬βν) ∧
“
θ ∧ (θ′|βν)
˛˛˛
¬βν
”
=
“
τ ∧ (θ′|βν)
”
∧ (τ ′ ∧ θ|¬βν ) = ⊥ unless τ = θ
′ and τ ′ = θ .
As a consequence, it is deduced:
σ∧ (σ′|¬βn) 6= ⊥ implies ∃(τ, θ) ∈ Cν ×Cν , (σ, σ
′) ∈
“
D[τ ]∩D[(θ|¬βν )]
”
×
“
D[θ]∩D[(τ |βν )]
”
.
Similarly, it is deduced:
σ′ ∧ (σ|βn) 6= ⊥ implies ∃(θ, τ ) ∈ Cν ×Cν , (σ
′, σ) ∈
“
D[θ] ∩D[(τ |βν)]
”
×
“
D[τ ] ∩D[(θ|¬βν )]
”
.
At last card(Σn+1) ≤
P
(τ,θ)∈Cν×Cν
2 card
“
D[τ ] ∩D[(θ|¬βν )]
”
card
“
D[θ] ∩D[(τ |βν)]
”
=
P
i∈In
2 card
“
Πn(i)
”
card
“
Γn(i)
”
= card(Ωn+1) .
E Probability extension
To be proved:
Let π be a probability defined over C , such that π(φ) > 0 for any φ 6≡C ⊥. Then, there is a
(multiplicative) probability π defined over DmBL∗ such that ∀φ ∈ LC , π(φ) = π(φ) .
The construction of π is a recursion based on the definition of (Ωn,Mn, hn, fn,Λn, µn)n∈IN .
E.1 Construction
The probabilities Pn|n∈IN are defined over Mn:∞ by:
Pn(A∞) =
X
ω∈A
Pn
“
ω∞
”
for any A ∈Mn ,
and:
Initialization.
For ω =
“
δθ|θ∈Θ
”
∈ Ω0 and τ ∈ Θ, define τω = τ if δτ = 1 and τω = ¬τ if δτ = 0 .
Then set P0
“
ω∞
”
= π
`V
θ∈Θ θω
´
for any ω ∈ Ω0 .
From n to n+1. For any (ω,ω′) ∈ Πn(i)× Γn(i) , set:
Pn+1
“
(ω,ω′)∞
”
=
Pn(ω∞)Pn(ω
′
∞)
Pn
“
Γn(i)∞
” and Pn+1“(ω′, ω)∞” = Pn(ω∞)Pn(ω′∞)
Pn
“
Πn(i)∞
” .
An example of construction is given in appendix F.
Notation. For m ≤ n and A ∈Mm, the probability Pn(A∞) is denoted Pn(A) for simplicity.
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E.2 Properties.
E.2.1 Proposition 1
Pn ⊂ Pn+1 , i.e. Pn+1(A) = Pn(A) for any A ∈Mn .
Proof. For A ∈Mn , µn(A) =
S
i∈In
 „“
A∩Πn(i)
”
×Γn(i)
«
∪
„“
A∩Γn(i)
”
×Πn(i)
«!
and then:
Pn+1(A) =
X
i∈In
0
@ X
ω∈A∩Πn(i)
0
@ X
ω′∈Γn(i)
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
1
A+ X
ω∈A∩Γn(i)
0
@ X
ω′∈Πn(i)
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
1
A
1
A
=
X
i∈In
0
@ X
ω∈A∩Πn(i)
Pn(ω) +
X
ω∈A∩Γn(i)
Pn(ω)
1
A = X
ω∈A
Pn(ω) = Pn(A) .
✷✷✷
Corollary. Pn(Ω∞) = 1 .
Derived from P0(Ω∞) = π(⊤) = 1 which is obvious.
Corollary of the corollary. Pn is indeed a probability in the classical meaning.
Additivity, coherence are obtained by construction. Finiteness comes from the corollary.
E.2.2 Proposition 2
1. Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
+ Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
=
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
Pn(bn)
=
Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
Pn(∼ bn)
, for any i ∈ In ,
2. Pn+1
“
µn(bn) ∩A
”
= Pn+1(bn)Pn+1
„
fn+1
“
A,µn(bn)
”«
, for any A ∈Mn+1 ,
3. Pn+1
“
∼ µn(bn) ∩A
”
= Pn+1(∼ bn)Pn+1
„
fn+1
“
A,∼ µn(bn)
”«
, for any A ∈Mn+1 .
These propositions are proved recursively.
Proof of 1. Obvious in case 1; the difficulty arises for case 0.
Assume now case 0, and let (ω, ω′) ∈ In , i.e. ω ∈ µν(bν) and ω
′ ∈∼ µν(bν).
Then
Pn
„
f
ν+1
“
ω′,∼µν (bν )
”
∩ω
«
Pn(bν )
= Pn
 
fν+1
„
fν+1
“
ω′,∼ µν(bν)
”
∩ ω,µν(bν)
«!
, by the recur-
sion hypothesis over 2, and finally
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
Pn(bn)
= Pn
„
fν+1
“
ω′,∼ µν(bν)
”
∩ fν+1
“
ω, µν(bν)
”«
.
Similarly, it is derived
Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
Pn(∼bn)
= Pn
„
fν+1
“
ω′,∼ µν(bν)
”
∩ fν+1
“
ω, µν(bν)
”«
.
Then
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
Pn(bn)
=
Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
Pn(∼bn)
and the result is deduced from Pn(bn) + Pn(∼ bn) = 1.
Proof of 2. Since Pn+1
“
T (ω)
”
= Pn+1(ω)
Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
Pn
“
Πn(i)
” for ω ∈ [
i∈In
“
Πn(i)× Γn(i)
”
, it comes:
Pn+1
„
fn+1
“
A,µn(bn)
”«
=
X
i∈In
 X
ω∈A∩(Πn(i)×Γn(i))
Pn+1(ω)
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
+ Pn
“
Γn(i)
”
Pn
“
Πn(i)
”
!
=
X
i∈In
Pn+1
„
A ∩
“
Πn(i)× Γn(i)
”«
Pn(bn)
=
Pn+1
“
µn(bn) ∩A
”
Pn(bn)
.
Proof of 3. Similar to 2.
✷✷✷
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E.2.3 Conclusion.
Define P∞ =
S
n∈IN Pn , that is ∀n ∈ IN, ∀A ∈Mn:∞ , P∞(A) = Pn(A) .
By inheritance from Pn, P∞ is a probability over M∞, which verifies the property:
P∞(A ∩B) = P∞(A)P∞
“
f∞(B,A)
”
, for any A,B ∈M∞ .
Define π(φ) = P∞
“
HB(φ)
”
; the additivity, coherence and finiteness of P∞ are inherited by π .
It is also deduced:
π(φ ∧ ψ) = P∞
“
HB(φ) ∩HB(ψ)
”
= P∞
“
HB(φ)
”
P∞
„
f∞
“
HB(ψ),HB(φ)
”«
= π(φ)π
“
(ψ|φ)
”
.
Then, ⊢ φ× ψ implies (ψ|φ) ≡ ψ and finally π(φ ∧ ψ) = π(φ)π(ψ) .
At last, π verifies the multiplicativity.
π is a (multiplicative) probability over DmBL∗ .
Rational structure of π . Let Σ =
˘V
θ∈Θ ǫθ
‹
ǫ ∈
Q
θ∈Θ{θ,¬θ}
¯
. For any φ ∈ L , there is a
rational function Rφ : IR
(2Θ) → IR such that π(φ) = Rφ
“
π(σ)|σ∈Σ
”
.
The proof is obvious from the construction.
F Conditional model: first steps of construction
In this paragraph, the objects Ωk, fk,Λk, µk−1|k=0,1 , i.e. one iteration, are explicitly constructed,
as well as the associated probability extensions P0, P1 (c.f. appendix E). It is assumed that Ω0 =
{a, b, c} . This hypothesis cannot hold actually, but the case is sufficiently simple to be handled, and
sufficiently complex to be illustrative. Only the case 1 of the construction is considered. Case 0 is
intractable in a true example. For simplicity, µk(A) and A are identified.
k=0. By definition, the list Λ0 contains the elements of P(Ω0) \ {∅,Ω0} . In this example, it
is chosen Λ0 = {a, b}, c, {b, c}, a, {c, a}, b and P0(a) = 0.2 , P0(b) = 0.3 , P0(c) = 0.5 .
k=1. Case 1 holds with Π0(b0) = b0 = {a, b} and Γ0(b0) = {c} .
It comes Ω1 =
n
(a, c), (b, c), (c, a), (c, b)
o
, µ0(a) = (a, c) , µ0(b) = (b, c) , µ0(c) = {(c, a), (c, b)} ,
P1(a) = P1((a, c)) =
P0(a)P0(c)
P0(Γ0(b0))
= 0.2×0.5
0.5
= 0.2 , P1(b) = P1((b, c)) =
0.3×0.5
0.5
= 0.3 ,
P1((c, a)) =
P0(a)P0(c)
P0(Π0(b0))
= 0.2×0.5
0.2+0.3
= 0.2 , P1((c, b)) =
0.3×0.5
0.2+0.3
= 0.3 ,
f1
“
a, {a, b}
”
= (id ∪ T )
“
(a, c)
”
=
n
(a, c), (c, a)
o
, f1
“
b, {a, b}
”
= (id ∪ T )
“
(b, c)
”
=
n
(b, c), (c, b)
o
,
f1
“
(c, a), c
”
= (id ∪ T )
“
(c, a)
”
=
n
(a, c), (c, a)
o
, f1
“
(c, b), c
”
= (id ∪ T )
“
(c, b)
”
=
n
(b, c), (c, b)
o
,
f1(c, c) = (id ∪ T )
“
{(c, a), (c, b)}
”
= Ω1 , (other cases are obvious)
and Λ1 = {b, c}, a, {c, a}, b + P(Ω1) \ P(Ω0) + {a, b}, c .
The relation P1
“
f1(B,A)
”
P1(A) = P1(A ∩ B) is easily verified for B ⊂ Ω1 and A ∈ {b0,∼ b0} .
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